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ABSTRACT 
Transnational criminal networks will continue to evolve. The United States 
Border Patrol’s (USBP) intelligence-driven planning, resourcing, and operations need to 
be responsive to the constant evolution in adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
To successfully standardize and institutionalize intelligence processes, a comprehensive 
evaluation was conducted on the current USBP intelligence architecture and intelligence 
processes.    
The research compared and contrasted the current Border Patrol intelligence 
mission with best practices, lessons learned, shared missions, and constraints within the 
Intelligence Community. The research focused on the synthesis of an intelligence-driven, 
law enforcement culture, one that will increase situational awareness and understanding 
of the homeland security ecosystem through efficient planning, collections, exploitation, 
processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence-related information to 
all components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This study examines 
literature from the DHS strategic documents, Department of Defense intelligence 
doctrine, Government Accountability Office reports, internal USBP intelligence 
documents, and subject-matter expert perspectives.  
This research leads USBP to consider instituting an effective organizational 
architecture that supports the evolutionary development of its intelligence-driven, border 
security operations and intelligence-driven, decision-making process. The thesis 
concludes that the synergy between law enforcement culture and intelligence-driven 
operations is difficult to achieve, yet once established, it is very powerful, irreplaceable, 
highly effective, and self-sustainable. Evidence demonstrates that in order to institute a 
culture of an intelligence-driven border security agency, a more robust approach needs to 
be standardized to sustain the flexibility and adaptability the USBP requires to address 
future threats in the twenty-first century.  
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United States Border Patrol (USBP) operations are dynamic. They encompass 
everything from static line-watch operations and narcotics seizures to serving high-risk 
warrants; yet, the most important mission of the USBP is preventing the entry of terrorist 
and terrorist weapons between U.S. ports of entry. This research provides an 
understanding of the USBP law enforcement culture, border security mission, and 
intelligence enterprise that will support the evolutionary development of its intelligence-
driven, border security operations between U.S. ports of entry and abroad. This research 
focuses on the USBP and the challenges in synchronizing a law enforcement culture with 
intelligence and building intelligence based decision-making processes to drive all 
planning and execution of border security operations. The research question to answer is, 
how does the current USBP intelligence architecture provide the necessary intelligence 
support to more effectively plan, collect, identify, analyze, and disseminate intelligence-
related information to all stakeholders while addressing emerging threats within its 
border security mission on the domestic and international fronts? 
The flow of information between intelligence agents and operations is critical to 
situational awareness. Understanding the perceptions, perspectives, and requirements of 
intelligence agents and operations can reveal opportunities to enhance information 
sharing. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
division and Customs and Border Protection Office of Intelligence could be considered 
the central nervous system of the homeland security friendly force ecosystem. If so, then 
the USBP and its Border Patrol Agent-Intelligence (BPA-I) personnel are the nerve 
endings and the sensory inputs into the friendly force information sharing network. With 
that said, it is recognized that there are a host of friendly force stakeholders that comprise 
the friendly force information-sharing network, but no single law enforcement agency has 
the intelligence collections human capital capabilities of the USBP.  
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To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our 
intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. We will 
continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion 
centers that have the capability to share classified information 
National Security Strategy, 2010 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed to the world that the United 
States was not as stable and secure as previously assumed. The United States appeared 
shocked and surprised that the homeland was vulnerable to acts of terrorism.1 From that 
infamous moment in time, it was obvious that the United States was in need of a robust 
Intelligence Community (IC) that could quickly and efficiently share information in order 
to inform decision makers with actionable intelligence to prevent acts of terrorism. On 
November 27, 2002, the president of the United States ordered the formation of a 
commission that would deliver a comprehensive account of the terror attacks and provide 
recommendations on how to avoid similar incidents from taking place against our nation 
in the future.  
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States (9/11 Commission), better known as the 9/11 Commission report, acknowledged 
there was a lack of unity among intelligence agencies that led to the attack by terrorists 
on United States on September 11, 2001. The report identifies four specific failures on 
the part of IC: “in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management”2 Since its 
inception, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made it a priority to support 
its mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States by infusing intelligence 
into its daily operations. Through information sharing with other federal, state, local, and 
private sector entities, DHS is able to further strengthen the overall stability of the United 
States. Information sharing is driven from the ground up by agents, assets, and 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], Final Report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004). 
Hereafter, referred to 9/11 Commission Report.  
2 Ibid., 356. 
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stakeholders in the field; the challenge is how to aggregate, integrate, and analyze 
information to provide a fused picture of the homeland security environment. 
This thesis examines the unique relationship between law enforcement personnel 
in the field and intelligence. As one of the largest uniformed federal law enforcement 
agencies in America, at an authorized strength of over 21,000 agents, the United States 
USBP (USBP) has a robust dispersion of agents along the southern, northern, and coastal 
borders. These agents provide pure horsepower for collections; they are the eyes and ears 
in the field for the homeland security intelligence enterprise. Since 9/11, the USBP has 
recognized the need for a specialized agent position, the USBP Border Patrol Agent-
Intelligence (BPA-I), with the specific mission of driving field-level intelligence 
operations at the tactical level. The USBP has continually enhanced capability and 
capacity of its intelligence agents with a target of having approximately 1,000 BPA-I 
nationwide. This study compares and contrasts the current USBP intelligence mission 
with best practices, lessons learned, shared missions, and constraints with the IC. 
Furthermore, it introduces the concept of the tactical-level friendly force network, its 
construct, and the requirements and challenges associated with generating and sharing 
actionable information. The principal focus is the synthesis of an intelligence-driven, law 
enforcement culture in the USBP that will increase situational awareness and 
understanding of the homeland security ecosystem through efficient and effective 
collections and dissemination to all components of DHS. Through a holistic approach in 
evaluating the role of intelligence within the USBP, linkages between the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels, this study provides a framework for risk-based, 
intelligence driven operations. The USBP will have to overcome the challenges of 
synchronizing its law enforcement culture with intelligence operations to more 
effectively identify, analyze, and prioritize enduring and emerging threats within the 
border security mission.  
The thesis concludes that the synergy between law enforcement culture and 
intelligence operations is a difficult one to achieve yet once established, it is very 
powerful and irreplaceable because it can improve overall efficiency for an organization 
but most importantly save lives. This research leads USBP to consider instituting an 
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effective architecture that supports the evolutionary development of its intelligence 
driven border security operations and intelligence driven decision-making process at and 
between our U.S. ports of entry and abroad. This thesis examines the question: How does 
the current USBP intelligence architecture provide the necessary intelligence support to 
more effectively plan, collect, identify, analyze, and disseminate intelligence-related 
information to all stakeholders while addressing emerging threats within its border 
security mission on the domestic and international front?  
Evidence demonstrates that over the last decade DHS, CBP, and the USBP have 
evolved and improved their intelligence focus and capabilities from reactive to 
proactively-led, intelligence-driven operations. To institute a culture of an intelligence-
led border security agency, a more robust approach needs to be standardized to sustain 
the flexibility and adaptability the USBP requires to address future threats in the twenty-
first century.  
A. BACKGROUND  
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the stability of the United States 
was challenged by unconventional enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). As 
a result of the catastrophic event that shook our nation to its core, the U.S. Congress and 
the president on November 27, 2002, ordered the formation of a commission—one that 
would provide a full and complete account of the terrorist attacks and to provide 
recommendations on how to prevent similar attacks from taking place against our nation 
in the future.  
As stated in the 9/11 Commission report, there was a lack of unity among 
intelligence agencies that led to the attack by terrorists on United States on September 11, 
2001. The four specific failures on behalf of the IC of “imagination, policy, capabilities, 
and management”3 should be a reminder of what can happen when intelligence is not 
properly analyzed and disseminated.  
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
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The primary mission of the DHS is to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United 
States.”4 Since 2003, DHS instituted an intelligence component known as the Directorate 
of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection that collects, analyzes, and 
integrates law enforcement and intelligence information. Through information sharing 
with other federal, state, local, and private sector entities, DHS is able to further 
strengthen the overall stability of the United States. DHS is part of a complex homeland 
security information sharing ecosystem. Figure 1 shows the southwest border information 
sharing community stakeholders.  
                                                 
4 P. L. 107-296, §101b(1), 116 STAT, 2142 (2002). 
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Figure 1.  Southwest Border Information Sharing Community 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Intelligence & Analysis Southwest 
Border Information Sharing Assessment,” Version 1.0 (internal document, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, January 2010).  
CBP has a unique and multi-dimensional mission that is charged with the 
management and protection of our nation’s borders within the air, land, and maritime 
domain environments. CBP’s border security mission extends beyond the actual land 
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borders as personnel and resources are strategically placed in countries abroad to 
strengthen America’s border security and counter-terrorism efforts.5  
According to the CBP webpage, on any given day, agency personnel protect more than: 
• 4,000 miles of border with Canada; 
• 2,000 miles of border with Mexico, and; 
• 2,600 miles of shoreline.6  
CBP also processes approximately “340 million travelers and more than 29 
million trade entries annually at our nation’s ports of entry (POEs).”7 Due to the volume 
associated with CBP operations, CBP collects and analyzes information and intelligence, 
both domestically and internationally, to prevent terrorists and their weapons from 
entering and conducting terrorist acts against or within the United States. Additionally, 
through its intelligence systems and processes, CBP is able to identify, analyze, and 
target, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating with a nexus to the border 
security environment. Working jointly with other law enforcement, intelligence, and 
investigative partner agencies, CBP leverages its resources to further disrupt, degrade, 
and dismantle TCOs therefore increasing the safety and security of the United States. 
Operating under the DHS umbrella, CBP has prioritized intelligence requirements 
and established diverse intelligence capabilities into a single cohesive intelligence 
enterprise known as the Office of Intelligence (OI). The OI supports all three CBP 
operational components: the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), Office of Field Operations 
(OFO), and Air Marine Operations (AMO). The USBP is a federal law enforcement 
agency with a workforce of over 21,000 uniformed USBP agents that conduct law 
                                                 
5 “About,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed September 11, 2015, http://www.cbp.gov/
about.  
6 “On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2014, CBP…” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed 
September 11, 2015, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2014.  
7 “Joint Written Testimony of CBP’s USBP Chief Michael Fisher, Office of Air and Marine Assistant 
Commissioner Michael Kostelnik, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition Assistant 
Commissioner Mark Borkowski, and Office of Field Operations Acting Assistant Commissioner Kevin 
McAleenan for a House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security hearing on 




enforcement operations in the United States and abroad. While USBP operations are 
dynamic, they encompass everything from static line-watch operations and narcotics 
seizures to serving high-risk warrants, yet the most important mission of the USBP is 
preventing the entry of terrorist and terrorist weapons between U.S. ports of entry (POE). 
This research provides an understanding of the USBP law enforcement culture, border 
security mission, and intelligence enterprise that will support the evolutionary 
development of its intelligence driven border security operations between U.S. ports of 
entry and abroad. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
There is nothing unifying DHS’s resources, both intelligence and 
operational, to ensure information is available to those who need it, 
priorities are driven from the top down, and resources are expended 
efficiently.  
2010 DHS Southwest Border Information Sharing Assessment 
Since the creation of DHS in 2003, there has been a corporate investment by CBP 
to create and refine CBP intelligence to enhance intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information among the CBP operational components to more effectively 
address unforeseen threats. Concurrently, the USBP has dedicated personnel, assets, and 
resources to enhance its intelligence capabilities. In conjunction with the CBP Office of 
Intelligence (OI) support, USBP intelligence is the major field-driven collection 
mechanism for homeland security. It is important to understand the history and nature of 
this relationship to identify areas where coordination could be enhanced. 
During the past 12 years, the CBP Office of Intelligence (OI) has undergone 
continuous top-level senior leadership changes in the last two presidential 
administrations. For example, in 2007, the office until then known as the Office of 
Intelligence was renamed the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination 
(OIOC). The focus at that time was to create synergy and liaison between intelligence 
and operational components while integrating the mission between both to support the 
mission objectives of CBP.  
 8 
Soon thereafter, after another change in leadership, the office was renamed the 
Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL) and its mission focus was broader 
than collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. In addition, OIIL’s efforts were 
expanded to include investing in building professional relationships and partnerships with 
other federal, state, local, tribal and international investigative agencies with the goal of 
creating a more efficient and effective intelligence community that supported CBP’s 
interests and mission objectives.  
This past year, under new leadership, OIIL changed its component name back to 
Office of Intelligence (OI). In addition, it has reorganized with a more strategic focus to 
support the CBP Vision and Strategy Plan 2020 that seeks to align CBP toward a 
common definition of success by articulating strategic objectives along with the 
accounting of performance measurements. Under this current leadership, OI is now 
aligning its efforts and identifying methods of approach to better support CBP mission 
objectives within the intelligence community, both domestically and abroad, with a focus 
on developing and implementing strategies that support a counter-network approach 
against terrorist and transnational criminal networks.  
Although changes in senior leadership are often a necessary evolution of the 
organizational life cycle, these changes often cause disruption and inefficiency among 
mission stakeholders. In the current CBP environment, case studies reveal a perception 
that OI and the other components are detached from one another both functionally and 
operationally.8 The multiple rebranding or reorganization of OI creates challenges to the 
creation of harmony and synchronization with the other components. Furthermore, the 
constant change in leadership impedes the development of a mature strategy and degrades 
cohesion with the field. CBP possesses a professional cadre of intelligence experts at all 
levels that are underutilized in informing intelligence doctrine, strategy, and standardized 
training. The Interagency Team to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook, issued by Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, states, “The interagency wheel 
                                                 
8 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, FY15 Capability Gap Analysis Process (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, 2015).    
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continually is being reinvented because of the dearth of formal doctrine and training.”9 
This is apparent in the absence of doctrine, strategy, and standardized training within the 
CBP intelligence enterprise, potentially leading to policy failures due to the absence of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) implemented and standardized among the CBP 
operational components. In some cases, a CBP operational component like the U.S. 
USBP, which relies on OI for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), or high 
altitude imagery for planning and targeting at the operational and tactical level, 
experiences perceived delays or disconnect from the intelligence system. Some field 
agents and BPA-Is may simply not be aware or understand how OI supports the border 
security mission. This leads to another critical problem area: strengthening the skills of 
the intelligence workforce to educate, train, and develop personnel to understand basic 
intelligence functions and exploit the new intelligence methodologies or approaches 
implemented corporately by the organization.  
Through this research, it became evident that within USBP headquarters for some, 
there is no clear understanding of the OI mission nor is there a clear USBP intelligence 
vision, mission, and goals linking to the USBP 2012–2016 strategic plan.10 There is a 
need to understand and gather the requirements for staffing the right amount of 
intelligence personnel, equipment, hardware, and software that a large law enforcement 
organization of over 21,000 uniformed personnel would require to function efficiently in 
today’s risk-based environment. The USBP is struggling to define the appropriate 
intelligence staffing model. To address this, the USBP has implemented a manpower 
requirements determination (MRD) process to conduct analysis on staffing and force 
requirements; the problem with MRD is that it lacked rigor and did not align with the 
reality of the field. Best practices in force restructuring consider task, standard, condition, 
ways, means, and effects to understand capabilities and the manpower required to execute 
                                                 
9 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular 
Threats Handbook (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009). 
10 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012–2016 USBP Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, 2012), http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
bp_strategic_plan.pdf.  
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those capabilities.11 MRD only seemed to audit tasks without consideration for the 
varying standards and conditions in every sector. More analysis is needed to understand 
the activities or mission essential intelligence tasks in every sector, as well as the 
standards and conditions that characterize success. Only then can the appropriate and 
required range of manpower be calculated to model an intelligence unit that can support 
the border security mission in each specific area.  
In addition to adequate staffing, technology is needed to manage and analyze the 
massive amount of border security data generated daily; however, overreliance on either 
technology or human judgment alone can lead to shortfalls. Intelligence fusion balances 
the best attributes of humans and technology. Intelligence fusion, or the process of 
“sensemaking,” is a complex blend of both science and art. Technology can be used to 
manage big data pulled from multiple, often disparate sources, but ultimately it is humans 
who are responsible at every level to provide inputs and analyze outputs in order to 
achieve desired outcomes (i.e., actionable intelligence).12 Without proper training and 
development, the USBP will not be able to take advantage of the amount of personnel it 
has at its disposal to execute the intelligence cycle.  
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research is focused on the USBP and the challenges in synchronizing a law 
enforcement culture with intelligence and building intelligence based decision-making 
processes to drive all planning and execution of border security operations. The research 
question to answer is, how does the current USBP intelligence architecture provide the 
necessary intelligence support to more effectively plan, collect, identify, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence related information to all stakeholders while addressing 
emerging threats within its border security mission on the domestic and international 
front?  
                                                 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment, User’s Guide Version 3, Force Structure, 
Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009).  
12 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009).  
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The following are a few ancillary questions for consideration in support of this 
research topic: 
1. What is the USBP intelligence vision and mission in place to direct 
intelligence-driven, border security operations? 
2. How does the USBP streamline collections and information sharing 
internally and externally within the homeland security ecosystem? 
3. How has the workforce been adequately educated, trained, and equipped 
to facilitate intelligence driven operations? 
4. What are the requirements for implementing information sharing 
technology to support intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination 
for better efficiency, transparency, and accountability among its 
components and partner agencies? 
5. How does the USBP use its Red Team capability in support of intelligence 
and operations to fully explore alternatives in plans, concepts, 
organizations, and capabilities in the context of the border security 
mission? 
6. How can the USBP support its Intelligence Division to enhance its 
capability and capacity to execute the intelligence cycle in support of the 
USBP 2012–2016 Strategic Plan? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis stems from the past and present endeavors to build a robust, resilient, 
and high-functioning homeland security intelligence enterprise driven by open and timely 
information sharing among components. The foundation of the intelligence enterprise is 
the friendly force network, which is a framework of nodes (friendly force actors or 
stakeholders) and links (communication channels and relationships). The base unit of the 
friendly force network is people: the agents, officers, analysts, and professional staff that 
work for a federal, state, local, tribal, international, or private partners. In addition, 
communities of interest (COIs) are comprised of the private citizens who live and work in 
the border security environment. Together, it is the connections and relationships 
between people that provide the framework for information sharing at the lowest level. 
This thesis examines three case studies to analyze the USBP intelligence unit through a 
descriptive lens of complex realism, or analyzing the relationships between the USBP 
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intelligence enterprise and its individual units, to understand the phenomenology of 
information sharing from the ground up.13  
Linking intelligence theory with practical application is a complex and 
traditionally challenging exercise common to many disciplines. The results of the fiscal 
year (FY) 15 USBP operational capability gap analysis process (CGAP) is the first case 
study in this thesis examining the intelligence gaps revealed nationwide. The CGAP 
methodology was developed by the USBP and the Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory Asymmetrical Warfare Unit using the scientific method to apply 
rigorous modeling and analyses techniques to the border security environment.14 The 
CGAP was designed to provide the highest degree of expedience while preserving the 
core elements of scientific method, academic rigor, and analysis. The CGAP is a scalable, 
flexible, and versatile process that can escalate rigor and resource to be commensurate to 
the complexity of the problem or environment being analyzed based known time 
constraints. The USBP has been utilizing CGAP throughout the nation to identify 
operational gaps because it can be agent-executed, using basic metrics and analytical 
processes to assess the border security environment; or when applicable, it can utilize 
analytical support from outside contractors and scientists to apply rigorous modeling, 
analyses techniques, and evaluative measures. The fidelity of the information resulting 
from CGAP sessions is an accurate reflection of the rigor associated with completing the 
process.  
The second case study this thesis adds granularity to the challenges associated 
with information sharing from the field to intelligence units, a USBP centric information 
sharing study was conducted in Tucson sector. The study focuses on assessing the level 
of ease and confidence through which USBP agents performing line-watch operations are 
able to share information they collected with intelligence personnel tasked with analysis. 
Additionally, the information sharing study looks to identify the gaps in effective 
                                                 
13 Liu Feng, and Zhang Ruizhuang, “The Typologies of Realism,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 1, no 1 (2006): 109–134.   
14 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular 
Threats Handbook.  
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communication and trust between the field collectors and the intelligence personnel. 
While there is a need to conduct additional research, the information sharing study 
indicates the need to standardize intelligence collections and dissemination processes to 
improve overall communications between the field and intelligence.  
The third case study this thesis examines is the Red Team study conducted by a 
Tucson Sector Red Team in Ajo, Arizona, utilizing applied critical thinking skills, data 
analysis, threat assessments, and friendly force capabilities to assess whether there were 
any early warning factors that could have been identified and planned against to avoid a 
spike in illicit migration and narcotics smuggling through the named area of operations. 
The analysis yielded several strategic indicators that could have been utilized to develop 
and coordinate intelligence driven operations to mitigate the high rate of criminal activity 
traversing through the west desert. 
This thesis will test the validity of two hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: The USBP has the capability and capacity to execute the 
intelligence cycle to provide situational awareness from the ground up; 
however, the USBP needs to understand its current capability baseline in 
order define capability gaps, mission needs, and requirement. 
• Hypothesis 2: The USBP Intelligence Division does not have a published 
unified vision and mission that provides meaning, understanding, and 
guidance to the intelligence agent in the field of their role in the overall 
intelligence enterprise. 
All portions of this study rely on the compiled literature on homeland security strategic 
documents, intelligence doctrine, and internal USBP intelligence documents.  
E. CHALLENGES 
According to the Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
analytical systematic biases can have an impact on the outcome of any intelligence 
analysis.15 This research must take into consideration three identified types of hindsight 
bias that could affect the analysis of the events concerning this thesis.  
                                                 
15 “Hindsight Biases in Evaluation of Intelligence Reporting,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/art16.html.  
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• Overseers of intelligence production tend to overestimate the degree to 
which events might have been foreseen. 
• Analysts tend to overestimate the accuracy of their own past judgments. 
• Intelligence consumers tend to underestimate the true value of intelligence 
analysis.16  
The Chapter II comprises a comprehensive synthesis of relevant doctrine, reports, 
and studies. Chapter III is an overview of the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise 
architecture, and Chapter IV provides in-depth analysis of USBP internal case studies on 
intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical level along with the assessment of a 
friendly force network to support intelligence efforts in the field environment. Chapter V 
outlines solutions and recommendations for the USBP to enhance intelligence capability 
and capacity.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Facts are stubborn things…Whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, 
or the dictates of our passions; they cannot alter the state of facts and 
evidence. 
John Adams 
The following is a review of available literature that relates to the challenges and 
issues associated with synchronizing intelligence within a law enforcement culture and 
organization. This literature review also provides insight into the IC, Department of 
Defense (DOD), federal agencies, and domestic law enforcement intelligence to examine 
their strategic guidance, best practices, and lessons learned. In addition, the literature 
expands to border security and the role of intelligence within CBP and USBP to support 
intelligence driven border security operations and counter-network approaches that target 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Other research to support this literature 
review includes reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), public policy organizations, and academia.  
A. USBP 2012–16 STRATEGIC PLAN AND CBP VISION 2020  
The foundational doctrine in any organization communicates the vision and 
mission for the workforce so it can connect its daily activities to the overall strategic 
plan.17 “Strategic plans” are ordered and developed within each tier of the government to 
describe what these organizations are doing to successfully accomplish a “whole of 
government approach” to achieve the mission of national security.18 The CBP vision 
2020 highlights the need for an enterprise information sharing system.  
                                                 
17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).  
18 White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/ndcs2011.pdf.  
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Figure 2.  CBP 2020 Vision and Strategy 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2020 Strategic Overview: Vision and 
Strategy 2020 (Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2015), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf.  
The literature review includes the analysis of an array of Government Accounting 
Office (GAO) reports, agency audits, and testimony relevant to national security. The 
GAO is tasked with the review of government agency strategic plans and provides 
progress reports to Congress on their success and failures. Reporting and accountability 
on valid performance measures is an important aspect to understanding the effectiveness 
of intelligence. Strategy and policy development also play a key role in outlining the role 
of intelligence in a border security agency like the USBP. In one report, the “GAO 
identified a set of desirable characteristics to aid government agencies in developing and 
implementing strategies and to enhance their usefulness in resource and policy decisions 
to better ensure accountability.”19 The characteristics the GAO identified are: 
1. Purpose, scope, and methodology; 
2. Problem definition and risk assessment; 
3. Goals, subordinate objectives, and performance measures; 
4. Resources, investments, and risk management; 
5. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; 
6. Integration and implementation.20 
                                                 
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in 
Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders (GAO-11-508T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011), 1.  
20 Ibid.  
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B. JOINT TASK FORCES AND FUSION CENTERS 
The September 11, 2001 attacks were the impetus for new practices, partnerships, 
and innovations in information sharing among DOD, law enforcement, and private 
entities. As of 2015, there are over 78 fusion centers to facilitate the integration of 
federal, state, local, and territorial partners with the overarching goal to share information 
in order to prevent and combat potential terrorist activity.21 Strategic plans for 
government entities, such as the DOD, DHS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), have 
tenets, objectives, or initiatives to support “whole of government” and “unity of effort” 
approaches to information sharing in order to leverage partnerships to enhance 
operational efficiency and effectiveness.22 Fusion centers are primarily intended to be a 
whole of government, integrated nexus of counterterrorism intelligence collection and 
analysis. Although fusion centers were originally intended to collect against terrorism and 
terrorist activities, fusion centers are utilized as all-purpose, all-source information 
centers that serve as a multiagency clearinghouses to address threats to the public domain 
relating to crime, hazards, and disaster response and recovery.  
There are questions and concerns as to whether and to what degree fusion centers 
are effective at preventing and anticipating terrorism, the nature of fusion center law 
enforcement support, and the irresponsible or illegal collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information on U.S. citizens. Administrative issues persist regarding 
efficient command and control (C2) common to multiagency cooperation. The purpose of 
this section is to examine the research on fusion centers to discern the fundamental gaps 
in knowledge and determine where more research is needed to elucidate the true efficacy 
and/or deficiencies of fusion centers. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports reveal that the majority of 
fusion centers were established to address information sharing gaps and generally have 
broad mission parameters encompassing intelligence collection related to counterterrorist 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” last 
modified September 14, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers.   
22 Torin Monahan, and Neal A. Palmer, “The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers,” Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 6: (2009): 617–636.  
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activity and as well as other pertinent law enforcement information.23 These guidelines 
allow for the expanded scope of practice from counterterrorism collection to “all crimes 
with national security implication” and “all hazards” information that are deemed 
fundamentally important to the information sharing environment and implement the 
national strategy. 
Bustria, Shenouda, and McDaniel note that the challenge of establishing a fusion 
center is identifying a “systematic process that translates national strategy and guidelines 
into state and local policies that will drive the operations of the fusion center.”24 Paté-
Cornell presents a quantitative research study examining the probability and risk analysis 
of information collected and analyzed by fusion centers. Additionally, Paté-Cornell’s 
main holding simplifies the fusion center to two essential functions: internal 
communications and the merging of intelligence collected.25 Thus, the primary goal of 
fusion centers is to collect information to prevent terrorism, but the functional role of 
fusion centers is to leverage partnerships to enhance effectiveness against common “all 
crime” or “all hazard” targets.26  
There have been few reportable terrorism related incidents that have been 
prevented; hence, the paradox of knowing the unknowable.27 Experts have maintained 
that a catastrophic event like 9/11 has such a low probability that there is little likelihood 
that a terrorism plot could be uncovered by fusion centers.28 The research shows that 
                                                 
23 U.S. General Accountability Office, Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform 
Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities (GAO-
09-93), (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accountability Office, 2008).  
24 John Bustria, Emad Shenouda, and Michael McDaniel, “The Functional Desks as Collaborative 
Mechanisms in the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center,” Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement no. 
2 (2008) http://www.hsaj.org/?article=supplement.2.4.  
25 Elisabeth Paté‐Cornell, “Fusion of Intelligence Information: A Bayesian Approach,” Risk Analysis 
22, no. 3 (2002): 445–454. 
26 Bart Johnson, “A Look at Fusion Centers: Working Together to Protect America,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin 76, no. 12 (2007): 28–32.  
27 James N. Mattis, USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2008); Jude McCulloch, and Sharon Pickering, “Pre-crime and Counter-
terrorism Imagining Future Crime in the ‘War on Terror,’” British Journal of Criminology 49 no. 5 (2009): 
628–645. 
28 Torin Monahan, “The Future of Security? Surveillance Operations at Homeland Security Fusion 
Centers,” Social Justice 37, no. 2–3 (2010): 84–98.  
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outside of “pro law enforcement” studies, fusion centers are undervalued or criticized for 
their contribution to everyday law enforcement efforts. It is evident from various 
doctrines that although counterterrorism is the primary goal of fusion centers, secondary 
functions include supporting law enforcement efforts. In addition, fusion centers are 
commonly known to provide valuable services outside the usual counterterrorism 
mission, such as assistance with routine criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster 
response, and recovery efforts.  
The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
conducted an investigation into fusion centers to determine if there has been an 
acceptable return on investment. Upon completion, the investigation revealed that the 
collaboration between DHS and local fusion centers was not productive and had not 
yielded any valuable support towards federal counterterrorism efforts.29 The Senate 
report was contemptuous in tone as it contradicts public statements made by DHS 
officials, who described fusion centers as “one of the center pieces of our counter 
terrorism strategy and a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”30 The 
Senate committee investigation also recognized that fusion centers “often produced 
irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no 
intelligence reporting whatsoever.”31 The most poignant criticism of fusion centers is 
that no fusion center reporting has uncovered a terrorist or contributed to any disruption 
of an active terrorist plot. The Senate report specifically states that it was evaluating 
fusion centers on the sole criteria of the “counterterrorism objectives established by law, 
Executive Strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments.”32 This assessment 
methodology drastically undervalues the operational effectiveness of fusion centers as 
they contribute to other objectives that support national strategic plans. One valid 
                                                 
29 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Majority 
and Minority Staff Report Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
subcommittees/investigations/media/investigative-report-criticizes-counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-
state-and-local-intelligence-fusion-centers.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
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conclusion of the Senate committee report was the need for “oversight to strengthen the 
protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting.”33 The largest 
deficiency of the report was that it did not evaluate any other metrics related to the 
benefits of fusion centers outside of counterterrorism efforts. If all agencies with a 
counterterrorism mandate were evaluated by similar standards, similar disparaging results 
would occur.  
Joint intelligence-sharing fusion centers are a theoretically sound and logical 
framework to share, collate, and analyze information among federal, state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement partners. Fusions centers provide a focal point for raw data to be 
merged, analyzed, and processed into viable intelligence. It is evident that there is a 
perception that fusion centers potentially abuse the mandate of conducting 
counterterrorism collections by surreptitiously collecting information about U.S. 
citizens.34  
More research on fusion centers is needed to illuminate present issues. Policy 
needs to be scrutinized to ensure adequate measures to protect U.S. citizen’s right to 
privacy are being implemented and adhered to on a regular and enforceable basis. Best 
practices on how to process the massive amounts of information and separate the wheat 
from the chaff is another persistent concern. There are evident problems with establishing 
a joint chain of command and how to develop and sustain the culture of a “need to share” 
environment from the traditional “need to know” custom. Research is needed to examine 
the enablers of a strong unity of effort within law enforcement culture to dispel the 
tribalism among individual groups and agencies. In the current government economic 
situation with large depth and looming budget cuts, programs must be resource neutral in 
the current and future resource constrained environment.  
C. DEFINING INTELLIGENCE 
A review of available literature demonstrates that there is not a standard definition 
of intelligence used by all. On the contrary, defining intelligence is more unique and 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Monahan, and Palmer, “The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers.”  
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complex. The Federal Bureau of Investigation website defines intelligence. It states, 
“intelligence is information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to 
policymakers in making decisions—specifically, decisions about potential threats to our 
national security.”35  
In his book titled, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Mark Lowenthal defines 
intelligence as “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policymakers 
and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs.”36 In a way, 
intelligence is information that provides greater situational awareness to the policymaker 
on a particular topic to influence decision making. However, as Lowenthal clearly 
outlines, “All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.”37 The 
USBP has not clearly messaged to the field a clear and concise intelligence definition 
therefore delaying the internal intelligence maturation process. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
INTELLIGENCE 
The homeland security joint publication published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
directs commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, 
joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the 
Services to conduct planning and operations to prepare to detect, deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its 
territories, and interests, and to mitigate the impact of adversary actions.38  
Intelligence related information plays a critical role within the DOD, especially in the 
homeland defense and civil support arena when engaging in emergency preparedness.  
Domestic law enforcement intelligence related information is also crucial to the 
stability of the United States, its borders, and its communities. The U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) has invested a significant amount of effort in strengthening and 
streamlining the information sharing capabilities among domestic law enforcement 
                                                 
35 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Defined,” accessed November 22, 2014, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/defined.  
36 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (JP 3-26), (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).    
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agencies. Through its various information sharing programs, DOJ has increased the 
capabilities of local law enforcement by providing it actionable information increasing 
the situational awareness of officers at all levels of government.  
According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002:  
The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to 
‘prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability 
of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in 
the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States.’39  
Since 2003, DHS instituted an intelligence component known as the Directorate of 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection that collects, analyzes, and integrates 
law enforcement and intelligence information.  
The 9/11 Commission report from 2004 identified the ability to share information 
as one of the key factors associated with the failure in preventing the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.40 Similarly, Mark Randol in a 2010 Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report points out:  
Congress also made information sharing a top priority of the new DHS 
intelligence organization, requiring it to disseminate, as appropriate, 
information analyzed by the Department within the Department, to other 
agencies of the Federal government with responsibilities related to 
homeland security, and to agencies of State and local government and 
private sector entities, with such responsibilities in order to assist in the 
deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks 
against the United States.41  
Also in a CRS report, Randol describes the larger DHS intelligence enterprise and 
provides an understanding of the DHS stakeholder agencies with intelligence 
responsibilities.42 This report provides a clear delineation on the role and duties of each 
agency and their contribution to the overall DHS intelligence and counter-terrorism 
                                                 
39 P. L. 107-296, §101b(1), 116 STAT. 2142 (2002). 
40 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 353–356 and 416–418.  
41 P. L. 107-296, §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146 (2002); Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland 
Security Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
42 Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Enterprise.  
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effort. Randal writes that some argue the DHS intelligence enterprise is too broad and 
counterproductive, as a result of the vast amount of information  
Richard Best, in a CRS report titled, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the 
Intelligence Community,43 explains the role that the various federal agencies and local 
law enforcement play within the intelligence community. He further explains that one of 
the challenges of information sharing between federal and local law enforcement is that 
at times both are gathering intelligence from the same sources and therefore, creating 
duplication of effort or redundancies.  
This literature review demonstrates that intelligence is vital to DHS, CBP, and the 
USBP as it provides critical information for increased situational awareness on known 
threats against the homeland. This type of information allows decision makers and 
policymakers within the USBP organization to execute tactical, operational, and strategic 
decisions within the homeland security environment that impacts the safety and security 
of its personnel, citizens, borders, and critical infrastructure.  
 
                                                 
43 Richard Best, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Intelligence Community (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010).  
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III. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 
The Department of Homeland Security was created not to increase the size 
of the government, but to focus and integrate our collective efforts.  
DHS 2004, Securing our Homeland.  
A. INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY 
Although the terrorist attacks against the United States took place over 14 years 
ago, our country continues to confront a complex and rapidly changing security 
environment. The Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) is inclusive of all stakeholders 
within DHS, including its component organizations and its intelligence offices, the 
members of the Intelligence Community (IC), the private sector, and state, local, tribal, 
and territorial governments.44 The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is the 
lead provider of intelligence and analysis for the HSE. The DHS I&A’s mission 
encompasses four core functions to: analyze, collect, share, and manage.45 DHS I&A and 
the U.S. Coast Guard are the only two DHS agencies identified as members of the 
Intelligence Community.  
The Intelligence Community is defined by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) as “a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that 
work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct 
of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States.”46 
Some of these activities include: 
• Collection of information needed by the president, the National Security 
Council, the secretaries of state and defense, and other executive branch 
officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities. 
• Production and dissemination of intelligence. 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan 2011–2018 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ODNI FAQ,” accessed April 4, 2015, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2.  
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• Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to 
protect against, intelligence activities directed against the U.S., 
international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other 
hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, 
organizations, persons, and their agents. 
• Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad 
necessary for the performance of authorized activities. 
• Such other intelligence activities as the president may direct from time to 
time.47 
DHS I & A and the U.S. Coast Guard are official members of the IC. CBP OI is the 
operational link that connects the USBP to DHS.  
 
Figure 3.  The Intelligence Community  
 
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ODNI FAQ,” accessed April 4, 
2015, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2.  
                                                 
47 Ibid.   
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1. USBP Intelligence  
Since 2012, the USBP has incrementally increased its intelligence capabilities and 
capacity with a target hiring of 1000 USBP BPA-Is. BPA-Is are supported by non-
uniformed intelligence analysts, typically at an approximate ratio of less than one analyst 
per 10 BPA-I. In addition, stations and sectors may choose to authorize collateral 
intelligence duties for regular agents. Stations also support the USBP intelligence 
enterprise with agents tasked with tactical collections and plain clothes or low profile 
operations to disrupt smuggling. The USBP currently has 1026 intelligence agents or 
BPA-Is. As intelligence practitioners, the BPA-I acts as intelligence collectors and 
analysts at the field level. The BPA-I mission is to perceive, understand, and 
communicate the approximate reality of the border environment to policymakers, or in 
the USBP’s case the chain of command (CoC) of first and second line supervisors 
through the patrol agent in charge at the station level, chief patrol agent of a sector, and 
headquarters staff up to the chief of the USBP. Although Lowenthal states that 
intelligence is not about the truth,48 the BPA-I must endeavor to stay true to the 
intelligence mission to inform operations. BPA-I must try to remain objective, minimize 
bias, and to operate independently of policy considerations; objectivity is the intelligence 
agent’s first commandment.49  
                                                 
48 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.  
49 Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013), 336. 
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Figure 4.  USBP Intelligence-driven Operations  
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012–2016 USBP Strategic Plan. 
2. BPA-I 
The BPA-I position was implemented in 2012 and is currently staffed at 
approximately 1026 agents throughout the nation. What this means for the USBP as an 
organization is the standardization and implementation of a nationally recognized 
position through the Office of Personnel Management. The USBP has now distinguished 
one set of USBP agents from the other based on a job description that is specific to a 
certain discipline. While being a BPA is still a current precursor requirement for the 
BPA-I, it will soon create a wider knowledge gap between a BPA and a BPA-I with the 
standardization and institutionalization of training and job requirements. BPA-Is will 
have a separate set of tasks from the recurring USBP mission essential tasks of detecting, 
identifying, classifying, responding, and resolving. The BPA-I is the only position within 
federal law enforcement with a specific intelligence nexus that does not require an agent 
having an intelligence background or experience. While most BPA-Is tend to have some 
sort of intelligence background, the USBP has not standardized, institutionalized, or 
memorialized the requirements for the BPA-I other than minimal information used in 
vacancy announcements.  
 
Intelligence-Driven Operations 
Identifying and developing a comprehensive understanding of 
terrorist and transnational criminal threats to the Nation’s 
borders is paramount in accomplishing the Border Patrol’s 
mission. We must operate by strategically using intelligence 
to ensure that Border Patrol operations are focused and 
targeted against areas of high risk, such as potential terrorist 
threats and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO). 
To accomplish the Border Patrol’s mission, we must continue 
to integrate intelligence and enforcement capabilities into the 
planning and execution of CBP  
USBP 2012–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN 
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Figure 5.  USBP Intelligence Synthesis 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012–2016 USBP Strategic Plan. 
The current lack of BPA-I training and lack of established doctrine resembles a 
common theme throughout the USBP. Even with the lack of doctrine within the USBP 
and more specifically USBP intelligence that does not mean the organization has 
operated without any established process throughout the years. There are several different 
standard operating USBP 2012–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN procedure (SOP) documents 
that detailed the SIU roles and responsibilities. One example is a 1997 document titled 
U.S. Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Unit: Standard Operating Procedure, which 
references the Border Patrol Handbook (Rev. 04/85), Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (I&NS) Administrative Manual (AM), I&NS Intelligence Officer Handbook 
(Rev. 10/88), and Guidelines for Intelligence Analysis (Rev. 09/93). This is proof that the 
USBP has made several efforts throughout its history to standardize, institutionalize, and 
memorialize an operationally functional intelligence construct. Previously drafted 
intelligence related documents that guide the USBP through and towards a productive 
Intelligence Synthesis 
The capacity to develop timely, well-formulated, and 
actionable intelligence is vital to the prevention and 
disruption of threats. The Border Patrol will meet this 
challenge by supporting an integrated intelligence platform 
that promotes information sharing throughout the domestic 
and foreign law enforcement community. This endeavor is 
accomplished through the integration and support of Border 
Patrol intelligence frameworks and other intelligence 
entities such as the CBP Office of Intelligence and 
Investigative Liaison, the El Paso Intelligence Center’s 
Border Intelligence Fusion Section, Border Intelligence 
Centers, and the interagency Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Center, as well as state and major urban area 
Fusion Centers.  
USBP 2012–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN 
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and comprehensive implementation of the intelligence cycle have been generated 
consistently for over 25 years. Without continuity within the USBP intelligence units at 
all levels, there is no succession management and hefty corporate knowledge losses due 
to attrition and career progression.  
The USBP has routinely adapted military planning and coordination as an internal 
planning process. The researched USBP intelligence SOPs follow the SMEAC format 
(situation, mission, execution, administration/logistics, command/signal), which provides 
the reader with simple yet detailed information needed to accomplish the mission. The 
mission excerpt in Figure 6 was taken from an intelligence SOP from 1997 to illustrate 
the similarity of expected outcomes from times past to current operational needs.  
Figure 6.  U.S. Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Unit 1997 Standard 
Operating Procedure  
 
Source: U.S. Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Unit, Standard Operating Procedure 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Unit, 1997).  
It is difficult to make a comparison between a BPA-I and other intelligence 
related positions within the federal government. The fact is that intelligence agencies 
have very specific job responsibilities for those that are intelligence professionals. The 
reason for the level of specificity amongst intelligence practitioners is the level 
proficiency not only needed to develop but to implement their specific skill set to a 
national security issue. Moreover, the intelligence professional needs to have access to 
Mission: The mission of the Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU) is to 
provide the Chief Patrol Agent, his staff, Patrol Agents in Charge 
and field agents with current intelligence. The SIU will 
continually analyze information gathered from all sources in order 
to predict future changes in the operational environment relating 
to the enforcement of Title 8 U.S.C. (alien smuggling) and Title 
21 U.S.C. (narcotics smuggling) in support of the Chief Patrol 
Agent’s operational strategy and the mission of the United States 
Border Patrol. The SIU is also responsible for coordinating the 
flow of intelligence information throughout the sector and the 
collection and dissemination of information to and from higher 
headquarters, adjacent sectors and other law enforcement 
agencies.” (U.S. Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Unit—Standard 
Operating Procedure 1/1/1997). 
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top secret compartmented information in order to adequately conduct the proper analysis. 
BPA’s are not currently required to have any clearance when first employed with the 
USBP. The lack of across the board standardized security clearances for USBP agents 
may adversely delay the organizational ability to adapt to emerging threats due to a lack 
of established processes.  
For the purposes of context in comparing and contrasting BPA-I with other 
intelligence professionals, below are the requirements and specific experiences needed 
for a general scale 12, intelligence specialist position with the Department of Defense: 
• Working knowledge of the DOD IC, including analytical production and 
intelligence requirements validation. 
• Working with a management team to develop and implement an 
assessment methodology that can be duplicated on a consistent basis. 
• Applying techniques and methodologies to problems with different 
aspects. 
• Preparing a variety of written reports to establish tactical and strategic 
planning with regards to future utilization of a signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) collection asset. 
Specifically, the specialist will be evaluated on the following competencies: 
1. Knowledge of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence 
requirement process. 
2. Knowledge of SIGINT and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).  
3. Ability to work independently with minimal guidance and direction. 
4. Knowledge of foreign intelligence services, organizations, objectives and 
modus operandi.50  
3. BPA-I Requirements 
The basic qualification requirements for a BPA-I position includes “experience in 
law enforcement or other responsible work that demonstrates the ability to make arrests 
and exercise sound judgment in the use of firearms; to deal effectively with individuals or 
                                                 
50 “Intelligence Operations Specialist—SV-0132-J,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed 
November 5, 2015, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/422301600.  
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persons in a courteous, tactful manner; and to analyze information rapidly and make 
prompt decisions.”51 
The above comparison is extremely skewed towards intelligence professionals 
conducting intelligence operations. A BPA-I needs only to be a BPA in good standing 
with the required time in service that accurately reflects the “required” experience. There 
is no mention or elicitation of specific intelligence requirements, whether they be 
academic or on learned on the job through experience. As the USBP continues to evolve, 
intelligence operations need to keep up with established IC guidelines to ensure data 
integrity and analysis fidelity. This can be instituted through a standardized training 
curriculum that will institutionalize the requirements for a dynamic BPA-I workforce. 
Additionally, it should not go unmentioned that the USBP has the capability of being one 
of the most proficient federal law enforcement collection agencies in the country due to 
the sheer number of uniformed personnel. This could be accomplished by emulating and 
instituting the “every soldier is a sensor (ES2)” concept developed by the Army.   
According to an Army field manual, soldiers that have been immersed within an 
ES2 construct will be:  
trained to actively observe for critical indicators related to CCIRs; will be 
competent in reporting their experience, perception, and judgments in a 
concise, accurate manner; Leaders will understand how to optimize the 
collection, processing, and dissemination of information in their 
organization to enable the generation of timely intelligence; and, 
technology enablers will anticipate and requisition to connect the Soldier 
to the intelligence process through digital reporting in real time.52 
According to the 2008 Army posture statement: 
The routine observation and reporting of patterns and changes in the 
operating environment through interaction with the local populace are ES2 
tasks now incorporated in Army doctrine, all initial entry training, and 
collective training at Army combat training centers.53  
                                                 
51 Ibid.   
52 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals 
Of Tactical Information Collection (FM 2-91.6) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2007). 
53 “2008 Army Posture Statement,” U.S. Army, February 6, 2008, http://www.army.mil/aps/08/.  
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Strategic messaging and training will be necessary to implement an ES2 type 
capability in the USBP. This strategic message should align to the strategic goals and 
objectives of a higher-level intelligence plan, but communicate directly to every agent, 
asset, and stakeholder in the field that they are a collector. To keep it simple, a USBP ES2 
concept requires three elements. First, agents should be provided a simple indicator list, a 
list of observable phenomenon for agents to look for, by their local intelligence unit. 
Second, agents should be provided a method of communication that is simple, fast, and 
easy to execute to send information. Third, agents should be provided feedback on the 
information they collect for validation and training purposes. These concepts are further 
explored in the analysis and solutions sections of this paper.  
B. ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS  
It is assumed that good situational awareness leads to good decision-
making, which is expected to result in a good outcome.  
Melinda Stanners and Han Tin French, 2005.  
The 2004 DHS strategic plan was the first effort to describe an enterprise 
approach to homeland security after the 9/11 attacks. The first goal outlined in the 2004 
DHS strategic plan was “Awareness: Identify and understand threats, assess 
vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts and disseminate timely information to our 
homeland security partners and the American public.” Awareness, or more precisely 
situational awareness (SA), is not only an end state but also a constant action to be 
cognizant of the state of affairs at any given moment. The USBP defines SA as:  
Knowledge and understanding of information that promotes timely, 
relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other activities 
within the operational environment to facilitate decision making. An 
operational/informational perspective to determine quickly the context and 
relevance of events as they happen.54  
                                                 
54 Mica R. Endsley, “Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems,” Human 
Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 37, no. 1 (1995): 32–64; Peter P. 
Perla, Michael C. Markowitz, and Christopher, A. Weuve, Transforming Naval Wargaming: A Framework 




Endsley conceptualizes SA as a function of time and space, perception of the past, 
compression of the present, and projection of the future. Rephrased, this is a cycle of 
being cognizant of “what has happened” in order to create meaning that informs the 
impacts on current events. Projection, perhaps the most important yet most difficult 
aspect of SA, is to anticipate the future and preemptively adjust actions to shape the 
future by influencing a desired outcome and mitigating undesirable outcomes. This is the 
essence of the role of intelligence on operations: to understand the truth of a situation. It 
is useful to analyze the nature of truth and its relationship to intelligence.55  
The original entrance to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters at 
Langley has a Bible verse etched in the wall, “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth 
shall make you free.” Clark quotes Pontius Pilate, who asked “What is truth?”56 The 
concept of and meaning of truth has been debated and discussed throughout the ages in 
many cultures and religions.57 These are the questions we are examining now through the 
filter of intelligence. DHS, CBP, and ultimately the USBP seek “truth” in establishing 
situational awareness to inform understanding, measuring, and defining border security. 
The USBP will need to continue to refine its intelligence mission to deliver timely, 
accurate, and relevant information to add context to the state of the border. 
C. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY 
The nature of intelligence is not only to provide situational awareness to the 
agents in the field but to inform strategy and policy throughout the USBP CoC. Members 
of the CoC has a constant need for intelligence to inform their decisions.58 BPA-Is then 
must not be influenced by the CoC and seek information solely to confirm their decisions 
with disregard to other relevant information. BPA-I must be policy neutral or risk the 
politicizing the intelligence. Lowenthal suggests that the politicization of intelligence is 
                                                 
55 Mica R. Endsley, “Measurement of Situational Awareness in Dynamic Systems,” Human Factors, 
37 (1995): 32–64.   
56 Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 127.  
57 John Koethe, “Poetry and Truth,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2009): 53–60; David 
Simson “Truth, Truthfulness and Philosophy in Plato and Nietzsche,” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 15, no. 2 (2007): 339–360.  
58 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3.  
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“one of the strongest expressions of opprobrium that can be leveled in the U.S. 
intelligence community.”59 Bruce and George advocate for focus on maintaining policy 
relevance while avoiding policy advocacy.60 The nature of the BPA-I mission, the 
command structure of the CoC, and the culture of law enforcement should mitigate the 
potential for political bias toward any specific agenda.  
The BPA-I and the CoC should have a symbiotic relationship. The CoC provides 
guidance, intent, and direction, while the BPA-I provides the CoC with estimates, facts, 
and informed assumptions to provide greater understanding of the border security 
environment. Nonetheless, it should be noted that both parties are subject to bias. The 
best-case scenario would be where the BPA-I and the CoC seek to know the “truth” of a 
situation and desire to understand and frame the truth in a useful context. The worst-case 
scenario would be the politicization of intelligence based on poor analysis influenced by 
bias. Reality is somewhere in between. It is the duty of the BPA-I and the CoC to commit 
to objectivity to accomplish the mission: the protection of the American people, the 
preservation of freedom, and the continual improvement of the analytical process.  
Often, too much bureaucratic oversight influences analysts to find the “book 
answer or politically correct answer”61 Analysts need the freedom to explore alternative 
perspectives and be unburdened from fear of erring. Luikart suggests that the “farther 
away” an intelligence analysis is removed from a decision maker, the more likely the 
information may not be taken seriously. In nearly every intelligence failure, the 
dissemination process did not communicate the right information to the right people who 
could act upon it.62 Effective warning and response are vulnerable to the potential gap 
between the CoC and BPA-I. Luikart explains that to bridge the gap between warning 
and response, the CoC and BPA-I will have to “search for common ground in 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical process so that warnings of 
                                                 
59 Ibid.   
60 James B. Bruce, and Roger Z. Greg, Intelligence Analysis-The Emergence of a Discipline 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 9.  
61 Kenneth Luikart, “Homeland Security: Intelligence Indications and Warning,” Strategic Insights, 1 
no. 10 (2002): 3.  
62 Ibid. 
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the most fantastic types of terrorist activity can be used to shape policy in constructive 
ways.”63 
D. NATURE OF THE THREAT 
Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) fit the definition of asymmetrical, 
non-state actors by the nature of both their network and operations. The non-state, 
asymmetrical nature of the certain adversaries creates challenges associated with 
planning, collecting, and analyzing warning intelligence. Butterfield, Meissner, and 
Kulisch define asymmetrical as an adversary with “no correlation of forces” that utilizes 
unconventional attacks to compensate for a perceived disadvantage.64 The nature of 
TCOs techniques, tactics, and procedures have the characteristics of an asymmetric 
adversary. The USBP needs an agile, adaptive, and situationally aware intelligence 
presence in the field to inform operations and policy that counter TCO activities. 
Combating asymmetrical actors like TCOs requires forward-looking, critical, and 
creative thinking. Traditional views on intelligence failure and surprise attack are 
anchored in the past. New knowledge and understanding of strategic warning dictates that 
the USBP must be asymmetrical in its methodology. The USBP SIU must not only be 
flexible in analyzing atypical indicators as opposed to traditional patterns, but it must also 
analyze traditional strategies and then abandon them if they do not yield high value 
information. Additionally, the USBP must continue to challenge assumptions and seek 
alternative perspectives on asymmetrical threats to improve strategic warning and reduce 
the likelihood of surprise. The USBP is growing its capability to leverage and exploit 
technology in the form of advanced analytics and technical collections. Dahl outlines the 
traditional view of intelligence as being inherently difficult and susceptible to error. He 
further delineates the “new school” of intelligence, or information age optimists, who 
                                                 
63 Ibid.  
64 Alexander Butterfield, Terry Meissner, and Gail Kulisch, Against Al Qaida: Improving Warning in 
the Asymmetric Environment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2008), 8.  
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take into account leveraging technology to exploit information and communications 
while noting that human intelligence is key to addressing terrorism.65  
Traditional views of intelligence generally focus on collecting information on 
traditional activities. In the new age of information, the Rand Corporation proposes a 
concept based on collecting information on atypical signals to indicate suspicious 
behavior.66 Additionally, the Rand Corporation notes that today’s security environment 
is characterized by a large volume and scope of information flow that exceeds the 
conventional capabilities to process it all. The USBP generates large amounts of data 
daily in locations all over the country and in Puerto Rico. The USBP requires the 
capability to integrate, fuse, and exploit all the generated border data into intelligence that 
correlates links, trends, and patterns of the adversary threat network. 
Traditional views on intelligence failure and surprise attack often examine 
traditional actions associated with war: troop movements, political rhetoric, and 
engagement. Williams suggest that law enforcement and, by proxy, the IC should be 
monitoring the financial indicators and their significance as related to a potential attack 
on the U.S.67 In addition, Williams outlines the U.S.’s strategy of “freeze and seize” 
terrorist funds but notes that this traditional strategy deprives the IC of a valuable tool to 
monitor, track, and exploit information gained from financial transactions.68 In addition, 
the freeze and seize strategy is not of a particularly high-payoff because of three factors: 
the limitations of international methodology monitor global financial operations, the 
relative low cost of terrorist operations compared to military actions, and the use of black 
market or illegal funding streams. In conclusion, Williams recommends abandoning the 
traditional strategies associated with attacking the finances of an asymmetrical adversary 
and instead develop methodologies to exploit their financial operations as a means to 
                                                 
65 Eric Dahl, Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against Terrorism (Medford, 
MA: Tufts University, 2004), 2.  
66 John S. Hollywood et al., Connecting the Dots in Intelligence: Detecting Terrorist Threats in the 
Out-of-the-Ordinary (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 2005).  
67 Phil Williams, “Warning Indications, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaption,” Strategic Insights 
4, no 1 (2005).  
68 Ibid., 2. 
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enhance detection of strategic indicators and warnings.69 The USBP can leverage the task 
force officers to query financial databases to detect indicators and warnings of illicit 
activity.  
One bias common of U.S. intelligence agencies is a rationality or coherence bias, 
also known as mirror imaging, which is along the same family tree as ethnocentrism.70 
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 Egyptian/Middle East conflict are examples 
of this. CIA analysts rationalized information to fill in gaps about foreign leader’s 
perspectives based on what made sense to the analyst. These biases are not new, and they 
have persistently endured because of the human condition. The USBP intelligence unit 
must be careful not to construe the adversary as acting the way we (Americans) would 
act. This means that a BPA-I must try to understand the belief system, worldview, 
culture, socio-economics, history, etc., from the adversary’s perspective. Then, it may be 
possible for BPA-I to forecast potential outcomes based on adversary behavior while 






                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jack Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good 
Analysts,” in Intelligence Analysis-The Emergence of a Discipline, ed. Roger Z. George and James B. 
Bruce (157–170) (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).   
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IV. ANALYSIS 
This analysis is based on three case studies conducted internally to the USBP at 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  
A. CAPABILITY BASED ASSESSMENT—AN OPERATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY GAPS 
Throughout fiscal year 2015 (FY15), teams of USBP agents from the Strategic 
Planning and Analysis Directorate (SPA), Operational Requirements Management 
Division (ORMD) deployed to every sector nationwide to conduct training (train-the-
trainer) and execute the capability gap analysis process (CGAP). The CGAP is a 
scenario-driven, capability based assessment process designed to compare adversary and 
friendly force capabilities to determine whether or to what degree an imbalance in those 
capabilities exists (i.e., identify friendly force capability gaps). The CGAP resulted in the 
production of data, analytical tools, and actionable knowledge that informed resourcing 
and acquisitions at the station, sector, and headquarters level through repeatable, 
traceable, and defensible systems analysis approach.  
Although the perspective of the FY15 CGAP was operational in nature, it 
revealed 21 high-level gaps from agents in the field. Each gap was correlated to a mission 
essential task (MET) or stage in the CBP intelligence cycle: planning and direction, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.71  
B. CGAP INITIAL INTEL GAP ROLLUP 
Table 1 is a capability gap assessment process that captures a description of 
current intelligence gaps as described by the agents in the field.  
                                                 
71 Capability Gab Analysis Process conducted throughout the nation at all USBP sectors during fiscal 
year 2014 at the direction of USBP Chief Michael J. Fisher. U.S. Border Patrol, Office of the Chief, 
Memorandum for All Chief Patrol Agents: Fiscal Year 2015 Capability Gap Analysis Process 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Border Patrol, Office of the Chief, 2014).  
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Table 1.   Capability Gap Assessment 
GAP # GAP Description 
15-USBPINTEL-01 USBP has limited ability to collect signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
15-USBPINTEL-02 USBP has a limited to no ability to disrupt or disable adversary communications (particularly scouts and guides) 
15-USBPINTEL-03 
Due to shift times and Union issues, BPAs are generally unable to 
conduct long-term reconnaissance operations with agents in covert 
LP/OPs 
15-USBPINTEL-04 BPAs are unable to quickly capture, submit, and receive intelligence in the field. 
15-USBPINTEL-05 BPAs have a limited ability to extract and exploit data from seized electronic devices 
15-USBPINTEL-06 BPAs are unable to quickly and competitively pay human intelligence (HUMINT) sources 
15-USBPINTEL-07 Agents receive a limited amount of timely, relevant, and standardized information from Station and Sector Intelligence shops 
15-USBPINTEL-08 USBP has a limited ability to analyze information/trends in order to predict future events and activity 
15-USBPINTEL-09 BPAs have a limited ability to conduct investigations 
15-USBPINTEL-10 USBP has a limited ability to receive and share information/intelligence with stakeholders (foreign and domestic) 
15-USBPINTEL-11 
Many BPAs have a limited ability to execute intelligence functions 
due to a lack of Intelligence training (Intel Cycle, LETC, DD/ER, 
targeting, collections PIRs etc.) 
15-USBPINTEL-12 USBP has a limited ability to collect multiple-source intelligence on a consistent and timely/actionable basis.  
15-USBPINTEL-13 USBP has a limited ability to process and exploit multiple-source intelligence on a consistent and timely/actionable basis.  
15-USBPINTEL-14 USBP has a limited ability to analyze and produce intelligence products on a consistent and timely/actionable basis.  
15-USBPINTEL-15 BPAs have a limited ability to fuse information due to system incompatibilities 
15-USBPINTEL-16 Some locations have a limited ability to conduct effective Intelligence functions do to manpower restrictions 
15-USBPINTEL-17 BPAs have a limited ability to interview and collect intelligence from subjects who speak unfamiliar languages 
15- USBPINTEL-18 BPA have a limited ability to access classified information (clearances and/or facilities) 
15- USBPINTEL-19 USBP has a very limited ability to exploit crime scene evidence (fingerprints, fiber analysis, DNA, etc.) 
15- USBPINTEL-20 BPAs have a limited ability to determine if reports made to a Station are a ruse that is intended to deceive or distract agents 
15- USBPINTEL-21 BPAs have a limited ability to receive timely feedback after Field Information reports are submitted 
Adapted from: Internal USBP CGAP work performed in FY15 across the nation. 
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C. LIMITATIONS 
The intelligence gaps revealed outputs of the operational CGAP have certain 
limitations that must be addressed: 
1. The CGAP process calls for a range of participants to attend the field 
Collaborative Analysis Exercise (workgroup); sectors assigned personnel 
based on availability and impact to the mission. Although recommended, 
there was no standard requirement for BPA-I participation. 
2. The gaps are based on an operator’s perspective. The gaps may not 
necessarily be “true” per se but reflect the respondents’ worldview based 
on their specific experiences and access to knowledge. A gap may reflect a 
messaging or communications issue. 
3. The gaps are aggregated based on the nationwide CGAP and are not 
necessarily true for all areas. More research is needed at the field level to 
understand the gaps in specific areas. 
D. GAPS REORGANIZED UNDER CBP INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
The identified gaps in the study were reorganized to align with the CBP 
intelligence cycle are broad, generalized statements regarding USBP intelligence gaps.72 
Although useful, more research is needed to understand the baseline of both current 
capabilities and capability gaps. The gaps are informative from a perspective of what the 
general mission needs. In addition, the gaps can be used to inform doctrine and strategic 
guidance. For instance, the USBP Intelligence Division can analyze the perceived gaps 
and mission needs and translate that information into strategy. This strategy should 
articulate the executive vision and mission of the Intelligence Division while also 
highlighting the goals and objectives of intelligence that support the USBP 2012–2016 
Strategic Plan. Furthermore, an Intelligence Division strategy should provide the 
guidance for a sector level intelligence supplement to operational implementation plans 
(OIPs), and the sector’s campaign plan should outline how it will contribute to the 
mission, goals, and objects of the USBP 2012–2016 Strategic Plan. At the lowest level, 
gaps, needs, and requirements can be captured and documented in each area. Senior 
executives must then prioritize each sectors’ intelligence requirements based on risk.  
                                                 
72 U.S. Border Patrol, “Tucson Sector CGAP” (internal document, U.S. Border Patrol, Tucson Sector 
Intelligence Unit, Tucson, AZ, 2014).   
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Table 2 is a chart depicting the results of a case study conducted by the USBP 
Tucson Sector Intelligence Unit in 2014. In addition, the chart outlines the CBP 
intelligence cycle. Each section contains the identified gaps at the field level in each 
category of the cycle. For example, in the area of planning and direction, there is a need 
to provide intelligence training to USBP agents (BPAs) so they are able to better execute 
intelligence functions in the field environment. In the area of collection, BPAs need to be 
able to recognize and exploit information and evidence that could provide intelligence 
value for the organization.  
In the area of processing and exploitation, the agency needs to increase data 
modernization systems so as to be able to fuse information more efficiently. In addition, 
the analysis section requires subject matter experts, such as intelligence analysts, to build 
consistency in providing intelligence products in a timely basis. Furthermore, in the area 
of dissemination, sector intelligence units need to do more to provide feedback to 
uniformed USBP agents on the information they provide on a daily basis.  
As a result of this study, a major gap in the intelligence training area is identified 
as a priority as it provides the awareness and lays the foundation to build a sound 










Table 2.   Consolidated Gaps 
Planning & 
Direction 
Many BPAs have a limited ability to execute intelligence functions due to a lack of 
Intelligence training (Intel Cycle, LETC, DD/ER, targeting, collections PIRs etc.) 
BPAs have a limited ability to determine if reports made to a Station are a ruse that 
is intended to deceive or distract agents 
Collection 
USBP has limited ability to collect signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
Due to shift times and Union issues, BPAs are generally unable to conduct long-term 
reconnaissance operations with agents in covert LP/OPs 
BPAs have a limited ability to extract and exploit data from seized electronic devices 
BPAs are unable to quickly and competitively pay human intelligence (HUMINT) 
sources 
BPAs have a limited ability to conduct investigations 
USBP has a limited ability to receive and share information/intelligence with 
stakeholders (foreign and domestic) 
USBP has a limited ability to collect multiple-source intelligence on a consistent and 
timely/actionable basis.  
BPAs have a limited ability to interview and collect intelligence from subjects who 
speak unfamiliar languages 
USBP has a very limited ability to exploit crime scene evidence (fingerprints, fiber 
analysis, DNA, etc.) 
Processing & 
Exploitation 
USBP has a limited ability to analyze information/trends in order to predict future 
events and activity 
USBP has a limited ability to process and exploit multiple-source intelligence on a 
consistent and timely/actionable basis.  
BPAs have a limited ability to fuse information due to system incompatibilities 
Analysis & 
Production 
USBP has a limited ability to analyze and produce intelligence products on a 
consistent and timely/actionable basis.  
Dissemination 
Agents receive a limited amount of timely, relevant, and standardized information 
from Station and Sector Intelligence shops 
BPAs have a limited ability to receive timely feedback after Field Information 
reports are submitted 
All Phases of 
Intel Cycle 
BPAs are unable to quickly capture, submit, and receive intelligence in the field. 
Some locations have a limited ability to conduct effective Intelligence functions do 
to manpower restrictions 
BPA have a limited ability to access classified information (clearances and/or 
facilities) 
Adapted from: U.S. Border Patrol, “Tucson Sector CGAP.” 
E. INTELLIGENCE DRIVEN OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONS DRIVEN 
COLLECTIONS 
The flow of information between intelligence agents and operations is critical to 
situational awareness. Understanding the perceptions, perspectives, and requirements of 
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intelligence agent and operations can reveal opportunities to enhance information 
sharing.  
In May 2014, the USBP Tucson Sector Intelligence Unit conducted a study 
involving intelligence agents to BPAs, supervisory USBP agents (SBPAs), and command 
staff.73 at three stations in Tucson Sector (Douglas, Brain A. Terry, and Willcox border 
patrol stations) to assess the level and effectiveness of communication between station 
intelligence units and the field.74 Station personnel were asked a series of weighted 
questions about their perceptions of communication between intelligence units and the 
field. In total, 310 agents were surveyed; 239 USBP agents, 50 supervisory USBP agents, 
and 21 command staff including, second line supervisors to patrol agents in charge. The 
survey results revealed key areas where intelligence units can enhance communications. 
1. Survey Questions 
1. Do you know who all the BPA-I’s are at your station? 
2. How likely are you to contact a BPA-I if you had info? 
3. How likely are you to get feedback from a BPA-I if you gave them info? 
4. How would you provide a BPA-I with info? 
5. How you rate communication between Intel and the field? 
2. Key Findings 
1. Do you know who all the BPA-I’s are at your station? 
About 55 percent of agents know more than half or most of the BPA-Is at 
the station. 
About 20 percent of agents know less than half of the BPA-Is at the station  
2. How likely are you to contact a BPA-I if you had info? 
Approximately 75 percent of agents would probably provide info to BPA-
Is. 
Approximately eight percent of agents would not likely provide info to 
BPA-Is. 
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3. How likely are you to get feedback from a BPA-I if you gave them info? 
Approximately 55 percent of agents think they would get feedback from 
BPA-Is. 
Approximately 25 percent of agents think they would NOT get feedback 
from BPA-Is. 
4. How would you provide a BPA-I with info? 
35 percent of agents prefer face-to-face; 34 percent preferred a phone call. 
5. How you rate communication between Intel and the field? 
Nearly 60 percent of agents think communication is good or outstanding. 
Nearly 40 percent of agents think communication is fair or worse.75  
The survey also captured qualitative elicitations via an open comment section on 
what BPA-I can do to improve communications with the field. Comments were analyzed, 
classified, and aggregated by theme. The top five results are as follows, in order of 
frequency: 
1. More muster presentations. 
2. Educate and inform agents about BPA-I duties, functions, and capabilities. 
3. Dispel the “secret squirrel” perception and clarify what information is 
“need to know.” Note: “secret squirrel” is derogatory slang for someone 
working in covert operations. 
4. Continue doing what you are doing. 
5. Provide feedback to agents that provided information to BPA-I.76 
The results of this study demonstrate that there is a constituency of agents who are 
generally aware of the intelligence mission and have the means and incentive to share 
information. The qualitative comments demonstrate a desire by agents for more 
information and to understand more about BPA-I tasks. The desire to dispel the “secret 
squirrel” perception of BPA-I also supports the need for more messaging and information 
about BPA-I duties. While disseminating information is part of the CBP intelligence 
cycle, the USBP needs to provide agents at all levels with a clear and concise message on 
how intelligence operations are conducted.  
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F. STRATEGIC INDICATORS AND WARNING: A U.S. BORDER PATROL 
CASE STUDY—AJO STATION 
The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in 
which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes 
when the stakes are high.  
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 
In February 2014, the chief patrol agent of Tucson sector sent a Red Team to Ajo 
to understand why the interdiction effectiveness rate had decreased dramatically (and 
unexpectedly). The Red Team found that from June 2013 through February 2014, the Ajo 
Border Patrol Station experienced a sudden increase in got-aways (GTAs)—detected 
illegal entries that avoid or evade apprehension.77 This analysis reveals that potential 
indicators and strategic warning signs were first detected in June 2013, but there was no 
significant action to address this situation until approximately eight months later when 
Ajo reported approximately 6700 GTAs for the first quarter of FY14. The list below 
summarizes the results of the Red Team analysis: 
• Throughout the 2013 fiscal year, TCA executed Operation United Front II, 
a focused operation designed to significantly displace and deflect illicit 
activity in the Casa Grande Border Patrol Station (CAG) area of 
responsibility (AOR), the AOR directly adjacent to the Ajo AOR.  
• In the early spring of 2013, intelligence indicated that drug trafficking 
organizations were disallowing any alien trafficking from occurring in the 
Ajo AOR and threating violent reprisal if anyone violated this order. 
• In March 2013, four Mexican nationals, who had allegedly been 
attempting to smuggle illegal aliens near the CAG and Ajo seam, were 
attacked by the DTO. All four smugglers were tied up and had their 
throats slashed; two perished and two managed to survive.78 
• In June 2013, Ajo significantly increased its situational awareness through 
increased reconnaissance, surveillance, target, acquisition (RSTA) 
technology deployments and the establishment of a data integrity team 
(DIT). A DIT is a specialty unit whose mission is to detect and reconcile 
illicit entries with apprehensions, turnbacks (TBS), and GTAs. 
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• In June 2013, the Ajo station began reporting a significant increase in 
detected illegal entries and a commensurate number of GTAs. 
• In October 2013, TCA implemented Operation Snapshot, an operation to 
provide a proof of concept based on the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform definition of “effective control” or the “ability to achieve and 
maintain persistent surveillance and an effectiveness rate of 90 percent or 
higher.”79 Effectiveness is “calculated by the number of apprehensions 
and turnbacks by the total number of illegal entries (note this formula does 
not take into account GTAs).”80 Operation Snapshot deployed additional 
RSTA assets and manpower to provide adequate respond and resolve 
capability to address the surge in illicit activity. 
• The after action review of Operation Snapshot revealed that this operation 
did not achieve its objective of persistent surveillance or 90 percent 
operational effectiveness. Post-operational assessment revealed that the 
additional surge technology deployments did not provide the desired 
results within the identified target areas. The operation achieved an overall 
effectiveness rate of 57percent in the target area. This effectiveness rate is 
a drop from Ajo’s overall effectiveness rate of 62 percent for August and 
70 percent in September prior to the execution of Operation Snapshot. 
1. Timeline of Strategic Indicators and Warning 
Table 3 contains the Ajo timeline of strategic indicators and warnings.  
Table 3.   Timeline of Strategic Indicators and Warning  
 
Source: U.S. Border Patrol, Tucson Sector Operations Division, “Red Team Operational 
Exercise: Ajo Analysis” 
                                                 
79 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (2013). 
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This outcome caused the Ajo station to be considered high risk to border security 
based on the USBP’s current definition of risk.81 The Ajo AOR is rural, remote, and 
expansive, which makes it difficult for agents to detect, identify, classify, and rapidly 
respond to threats.  
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
Author Joshua Cooper Ramo, in his book The Age of the Unthinkable, addresses 
the need for deep security as a system to be flexible and adaptive to new threat.82 Deep 
security dictates aggressively communicating indicators and warning for timely 
intelligence. This means that the BPA-I must be bold, direct, and succinct in 
communication of indicators and warning to the CoC. Likewise, leaders throughout the 
CoC must apply these principles to concise yet aggressive messaging to brief all the high 
points clearly and directly, supporting the superior commander with information needed 
for timely action.  
One of the greatest hurdles affecting timely action necessary to counter threats is 
the excessive amount of information given to policymakers. To counter this, agents 
should use commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and their derivatives 
to focus intelligence collections.83 CCIRs are developed with commanders and 
policymakers in mind and with their input, but they also include input from the field. 
CCIRs are the key questions, the critical pieces of information that reduce uncertainty 
and support decision making.84 Moreover, CCIRs help reduce inundation of information 
by focusing on the truly important. This can reduce the information overload factor by 
allowing the commander to dictate what information she or he requires (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7.  Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Assessments 
 
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence. 
McLaughlin relates that in his experience, he has encountered two types of 
intelligence consumers: those who know how to correctly interpret intelligence and those 
who did not nor would not.85 In that aspect, the BPA-Is must focus their intelligence 
briefs to the “lowest common denominator” in order to ensure proper messaging to a 
broad audience. The Red Team briefing 101 states, “Knowing the audience is the key to 
success.”86 Who is the audience, what do they need to know, and ends with a clearly 
stated “path forward.”87 Well rounded BPA-Is must be proficient in communication as 
they operate in research and analysis. The USBP should be able to tailor or message to 
the audience in such a manner that makes sense to that specific group of information 
recipients to ensure common understanding and transparency.  
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If a high-risk border security event was imminent in the United States, such as the 
recent unaccompanied juvenile crisis,88 and the SIU produced reliable indications and 
warnings, our field personnel would be prepared to address and mitigate any potential 
risk to national security. Lowenthal summarizes the three hurdles that affect timely action 
necessary to counter a threat. For example, he suggests that warning, analytical process, 
and information sharing are the analytical standards that support timely action to counter 
threats.89 In addition, Lowenthal highlights 9/11 as an example of warning in that the 
intelligence community failed to fully communicate about the impending nature of the 
threat.90 Policymakers were left with an imprecise sense of the threat.91 The analytical 
process “connects the dots” illustrating patterns and linkages to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the threat.92 In the case of the Ajo Border Patrol Station, the deficiency was 
not necessarily the inability to connect the dots but to “align the arrows.” The Tucson 
Sector CoC needed to understand the forecasted trends and patterns of a surge in illicit 
traffic that would exceed the organic capabilities to respond and resolve the surge 
effectively. With these warning signs and knowledge of the constant difficulty associated 
with maintaining a fully staffed station due to the remoteness of the area, the CoC could 
have implemented changes to mitigate the increased illicit activity.  
H. ON ANTICIPATING SURPRISE 
As part of the discussion on timely warnings, it is useful to examine human nature 
and the difficulty of anticipating surprise. Historically, there is a common theme as to 
why people have trouble believing indications and warnings prior to an event and why 
countries are caught unaware by surprise. Determining the warning signals from the 
background noise is difficult.93 The warning process must yield information that is 
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timely, relevant, actionable, and believable. Perception, bias, and uncertainty make 
people and countries fall victim to surprise. Wirtz and Porch highlight three common 
reasons that often factor into intelligence failures: the challenge of harvesting actionable 
information in the “noise” created by mass data collection, underestimating the enemy’s 
capabilities to take action, and mirror imaging (the assumption that enemy actions are 
unlikely because it was “illogical).”94 As previously mentioned, mirror imaging is a 
common bias that results in surprise because friendly forces evaluate enemy actions 
based on a common “rationality” or a common worldview where all rational actors would 
make similar decisions. People and countries assume that the enemy thinks like them. 
This bias can be mitigated by analyzing the enemy in depth from its own perspective. 
Davis recommends bringing in Red Teams on major analytic problems to work with 
analysts.95 One function of the Red Team is to assess, analyze, and understand the 
factors that shape the enemy’s environment. Analysts need to consider culture, 
socioeconomics, politics, religion, and other critical variables when trying to understand 
the enemy worldview and value system. If used effectively, a Red Team can help 
mitigate bias by challenging assumptions and informing decisions.96 It should be noted 
that Tucson Sector brought in a Red Team after the fact to understand the problem in 
Ajo. In hindsight, it might have been valuable to insert the Red Team’s analysis early in 
the intelligence process to help mitigate surprise. 
Perception is another component that compromises the ability of people to 
understand warning and thus enables surprise. Grabo notes that actors typically assume 
their adversary will act in a manner consistent with their historical actions.97 Grabo holds 
that this is often true but warns that historical precedence must be discounted in light of 
current information that indicates the contrary; an adversary may act differently than its 
traditional behavior.98 Grabo calls this “a fundamental cause of warning failures—that 
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the behavior of the aggressor appears inconsistent that what we expect them to do.”99 
The perception of historical actions by the adversary to predict future behavior is a useful 
heuristic, but it is not an anchor. Grabo advises that analysts must consider the perception 
of the enemy to understand what they might do.100 Objective analysis of current 
information must be analyzed at face value to assess current indicators and the reality of 
potential threats. Therefore, it is critically important to have a basic understanding of 
intelligence and the importance of analytical information to recognize the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures used by an adversary.  
People and countries fall victim of surprise due to their perception of the 
environment or their perceived situational awareness. This is true for intelligence analysts 
as well. Often, analysts focus only on what they know. Yet, it is the uncertainty and the 
unknown that present the greatest risk of surprise. Davis notes that Rumsfeld 
Commission tasked analysts with taking greater consideration of what they do not 
know.101 Red Team methodology encourages taking that concept of “what we don’t 
know” one step further: to consider the things we do not know we do not know. The 
highly speculative and deeply philosophical nature of this concept makes it challenging to 
apply, but it can be a valuable tool. Exploring the potential information we do not know 
that we do not know can yield new questions to reduce uncertainty, understand warning, 
and mitigate surprise.  
According to Grabo, “warning intelligence…is not produced in a vacuum, 
divorced from the rest of the intelligence process or from any number of other 
influences.”102 These influences can be blinding to analysts and policymakers as they 
evaluate and come to conclusions regarding the validity of indications and warning. 
Grabo further explains that the greatest factor of influence is the inability to conceive of 
the possibility.103 Considering that no major attack had been perpetrated on American 
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soil by a foreign aggressor in six decades, the indications and warnings leading up to the 
9/11 attacks were largely ignored because the information seemed to suggest the 
impossible. Porch and Wirtz explain that it is not unusual for indications and warnings to 
be set aside if they seem unbelievable.104 This was especially true of intelligence leading 
up to the 9/ 11 attacks.  
Relevant information may be filtered out as it is sent up the bureaucratic 
chain because it seems unimportant, trivial or irrelevant to more important 
concerns—such as local FBI agents reporting that Arab students in flight 
schools only wished to learn how to take off, not to land,105  
In hindsight, this was incredibly obvious that these individuals were not seeking to land. 
Although information can be deemed irrelevant for analysis, it can also be pushed 
aside as impossible due to “…’mirror-imaging’—the belief that the perpetrators will not 
carry out a particular act because the defender, in their place, would not do it.”106 In the 
case of the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks,  
The notion of ‘suicide bombing’ [was] so alien to the American—indeed 
the Western—outlook, that we find it difficult to fathom the mindset of 
enemies prepared to conceive of an operation of such horrific proportions, 
one in which they are prepared to immolate themselves in acts of fiery 
desperation.107  
This is what leads countries, including the United States, to be caught unaware by 
surprise. The inability to believe that an attack is possible, that the perpetrator would 
utilize a certain method of attack, such as suicide bombing, and an overabundance of 
unanalyzed intelligence all lead to surprise and what appears to be a complete lack of 
warning. Making improvements to the intelligence system of collection, analysis, and 
dissemination is important in light of failures; however, it is also important to remember:  
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There is no way, short of being able to read the adversary’s mind, that we 
can be confident that our warning judgments, or even many of our ‘facts,’ 
are going to be correct… As we have been surprised in the past, we shall 
be surprised again in the future.108 
As previously experienced with the 9/11 attacks, intelligence products need to be 
socialized and further processed amongst the IC to identify and develop alternative 
possibilities on the data collected. For example, if a high-risk border security event were 
imminent in the United States and sector intelligence units produced reliable indications 
and warnings, another barrier would be the “black swan” effect. In 2007, Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb published The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, in 
which he argues that we should never ignore the possibility or importance of rare, 
unpredictable events. Taleb defines a black swan event as one that has a low probability 
of occurring but that would have a massive impact.109 This is a problem of predictive 
analysis; analysts often focus on the most likely enemy course of action without fully 
considering how to mitigate the effects of the enemy’s most dangerous course of action. 
Policymakers are typically the primary consumers of intelligence products. According to 
McLaughlin, there are two types of intelligence consumers: those who know how to 
interpret intelligence correctly and those who did not or would not.110 Before 9/11, most 
people would have thought it preposterous that terrorists could fly a plane into the World 
Trade Center. This paradigm changed dramatically and forever after on the day after 9/
11. Recently, the USBP experienced a crisis of mass migration of unaccompanied 
children from Central America, overwhelming the capability to house, feed, and meet the 
special needs of the detained children. Prior to the crisis, the USBP assumed the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would managed unaccompanied 
children, as meeting these needs were within HHS mission parameters. However, HHS 
was quickly overwhelmed and the USBP had to quickly adapt and transform its 
capability so it could safely and humanly manage hundreds of thousands of 
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unaccompanied children. There is some evidence that the available intelligence warning 
and the USBP response was predicated on other factors that were not validated, adding to 
the unanticipated surprise.  
The Ajo study highlights a common challenge that impacts timely action to 
counter an imminent event.111 The effect of “crying wolf” is a common theme in many 
intelligence textbooks. Lowenthal cites this as a “numbing effect” on policymakers that 
occurs with the ongoing production and delivery of intelligence products.112 Repeatedly 
messaged threats lose impact and urgency. In addition, it is difficult to prove when 
intelligence successfully counters a threat. For example, suppose that an intel unit 
receives timely and credible intelligence about a potential attack on a military base. The 
intel unit informs the base commander, who implements security measures to prevent the 
attack. Due to an increased security posture, the attack never occurs. How can the 
commander be sure that the attack would have happened without the additional security 
measures? It is extremely difficult to prove a negative, to prove that an event never 
happened due to timely exploitation of actionable intelligence. A parallel can be drawn 
from this to Border Patrol operations. If the amount of illegal aliens and or seizures made 
in a high activity area begin to decrease, can this be attributed to a shift in line 
operations? Or, when there is a sudden increase in GTA at a station, what was the actual 
change, did the adversary’s effectiveness increase? Did the friendly force capability or 
effectiveness decrease? Or potentially an unknown factor has influenced operations? In 
the case of Ajo, it was apparent that a breakdown in communications occurred at every 
level.  
Lowenthal cites another challenge to timely action, the struggle between current 
and long-term intelligence.113 The nature and expediency of analyzing and producing 
current intelligence is a constraint to timely action. The analysts will be pressed for time 
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to add the depth and context to that they deem valuable.114 Moreover, Clark notes that 
the intelligence process is very fast at the tactical level.115 Indeed, this is often true for 
the USBP. For example, a USBP priority intelligence requirement (PIR) may be “when 
and where do smugglers attempt to illegally cross the border?” Presume BPA-I has a 
confidential informant (CI) that has credible information about an illegal crossing that 
will occur that evening sometime after midnight. This would be the latest time of value 
(LTOV), the latest time this information will be actionable. When the CI calls in the 
LTOV information that the event is about to occur, a sequence of events must be 
executed expeditiously. The BPA-I must alert the commander of the AOR. The 
commander must consider the appropriate deployment of resources and synchronize the 
ground troops with intelligence surveillance reconnaissance/reconnaissance surveillance 
target acquisition (ISR/RSTA) assets. All the interdiction resources must then respond to 
the area and execute the interdiction. Furthermore, all this must occur within the window 
of opportunity before the smugglers can blend in with the local populace. 
There are many barriers to executing action to counter an impending threat. It is 
imperative for the analyst to communicate as complete of a threat picture as possible and 
provide as much relevant information in a succinct package for policymakers. 
While tactical warning often focuses on measurable indicators, such as the 
deployment of enemy forces in an area, strategic warning is often ambiguous and open to 
interpretation. Leaders often disbelieve ambiguous strategic warning or warning without 
sufficient evidence to support it. Prior to the start of the Berlin blockade, General Lucius 
Clay sent a message to Washington that said,  
Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude, 
which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may 
come with dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own 
thinking with any data or outward evidence in relationships other than to 
describe it as a feeling of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with 
whom we have official relations.116  
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Such absence of definitive detail is fairly common in strategic warning, and 
decision makers are unable to respond to all non-specific warnings due to a lack of time 
and resources. They must decide which warnings to heed and ignore. Since intelligence 
analysts and policymakers must utilize incomplete information or information from 
uncertain sources to provide warning or implement countermeasures, there is a wide 
margin for error. Any warning from intelligence analysts must be convincing enough and 
have enough evidence to spur decision makers, who have an “aversion to undertaking 
costly, unpopular, and otherwise inconvenient countermeasures,” into action.117 Because 
of the massive volume of information that analysts and decision makers receive, 
underestimation of adversaries and biases, such as mirror imaging warnings,118 such as 
the 9/11 attacks, get missed. Thus, countries such as the U.S. are caught flat-footed. 
Cynthia Grabo wrote of vague warnings, “More rather than fewer facts, specific 
rather than generalized assessments, clear and realistic descriptions of the various 
alternatives rather than vague possibilities, and firm and unequivocal statements of the 
adversary’s capabilities and possible or probable intentions are required.”119 It is an 
unfortunate reality that sometimes the intelligence to fully identify a threat just does not 
exist. When that happens, although a policymaker realizes she or he has been warned, he 
or she does not know exactly what the warning is about. A vague warning provides little 
to act upon, and so very often, nothing is done about it. 
The “tyranny of current intelligence” is the cognitive trap that causes analysts to 
overemphasize the “now.” Current intelligence is important to the tactical level, or 
combat support operations, which require real-time information to respond to threats.120 
Fusion centers are designed “to facilitate the fast synthesis of data to support ongoing 
tactical operations and to allow additional collection to be done intelligently in a short 
period of time.”121 In addition, fusion centers are a relatively new development in the IC. 
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Originally, fusion centers came about after 9/11 as a means to address the stovepipe 
effect and lack of information sharing that contributed to the inability to prevent 9/11. 
Over the last 10 years, there was a natural progression for fusion centers in which they 
have generally shifted focus to criminal activity in order to be productive. Ideally, fusion 
centers function as a clearinghouse for data from all levels of law enforcement from the 
local, state, federal, tribal, and sometimes international law enforcement partners.122 
Clark highlights two of the major criticisms of fusion centers: that they do little true 
fusion of intelligence and the risk of violations of U.S. citizen privacy and civil 
liberties.123 A true fusion of intelligence will eventually occur. The first steps of bringing 
IC partners to a centralized point and establishing processes to exchange information 
have occurred. Next, transparency and accountability must be assessed for fidelity to 
identify deficiencies. Fusion centers should continue to implement and improve self-
inspection programs to ensure policy compliance with constitutional law. Furthermore, 
fusion centers need refinement to enhance efficiency and effectiveness; they are the 
future of a whole-of-government approach to intelligence analysis.  
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V. SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conduct a thorough, field-level analysis to establish a baseline of current 
intelligence capabilities, capability gaps, and mission needs. 
2. Provide intelligence-centric strategic guidance to unify, synchronize, and 
coordinate efforts to continue to expand and enhance the friendly force 
information-sharing network.  
3. Establish clear guidelines and standard operating procedure (SOP) for 
collections at the field level, facilitated by a collection manger, to ensure 
useful, timely, and relevant intelligence collections.  
4. Understand the mission needs and requirements for information-sharing 
technology for future acquisitions. 
5. Gain an understanding of all Red Team efforts in the field and better 
utilize the cadre of trained Red Team personnel as an additional level of 
analytical rigor for high-level projects. 
6. Begin intelligence indoctrination at the academy to reinforce that every 
agent is a collection asset. 
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I 
would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, 
for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in less than 
five minutes. 
Albert Einstein 
Before addressing solutions and recommendations, it must be acknowledged that 
correctly framing the problem is always the first step toward improving a system. That 
does not preclude this study from making high-level recommendations, but it highlights 
the need for deep dive analysis at the field level to understand the mission needs and 
requirements from the ground up. The USBP Intelligence Division is currently planning 
capability gap analysis process (CGAP) of intelligence functions and operations. The 
results of the CGAP should provide a baseline measurement of the USBP’s capability to 
execute the intelligence cycle properly. A thorough understanding of USBP intelligence 
capabilities and capability gaps, viewed through the lens of strategic goals and objectives, 
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will outline the priorities for a path forward to developing the requirements to transition 
the USBP sector intelligence units into the premier border security intelligence enterprise 
system.   
C. PLANNING 
Plans are nothing, planning is everything. 
Dwight. D. Eisenhower 
A wealth of guidance, vision, and strategic level direction has been published by 
DHS, CBP, and the USBP. The DHS National Response Framework states, “Planning 
across the full range of homeland security operations in an inherent responsibility of 
every level of government.”124 Historically, the centralized planning and decentralized 
execution of strategy has allowed field commanders to accomplish the mission based on 
their wisdom, judgment, and experience. The USBP has made great strides in publishing 
a strategic plan with associated measure and metrics to inform on the progress of 
accomplishing the mission; however, the USBP could provide more specific guidance to 
unify, synchronize, and coordinate efforts to continue to expand and enhance the friendly 
force information-sharing network at the field level. For example, an intelligence 
planning supplement to the USBP 2012–2016 Strategic Plan or future plan would be 
useful to describe the high level vision, mission specific guidance to the USBP 
intelligence division, the goals and objectives of the intelligence mission in supporting 
operations. An intelligence plan should also have measures and milestones to inform 
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There are opportunities to provide additional clarification at the sector level. 
Every sector must produce an operational implementation plan (OIP). The OIP is the 
articulation of that sector chief’s priorities, strategy, and objectives in furtherance of the 
national strategy. An intelligence plan supplement to the OIP would capture the sector 
intelligence unit’s specific goals and objects in support of sector operations. Again, the 
value in these documents are the measures and milestones that inform toward progress 
and performance. These intelligence annexes would also serve as a guide to field 
commanders when synchronizing tactical level operations with operational and strategic 
level intelligence requirements. 
Planning and Direction is the first phase of the intelligence cycle, yet anecdotal 
and empirical evidence suggests no intelligence-centric planning training exists. Because 
the USBP is still working on developing and subsequently publishing intelligence 
doctrine, there is no common understanding on what is needed to accomplish certain 
tasks.  
D. COLLECTIONS 
Everyone is an intelligence officer—that’s sort of our theme. If you’re 
talking about a paradigm shift, this is it: You have to see everyone you 
come in contact with as having intelligence value. 
MAJ Michael S. Patton, Operations Officer, 4–27 Field Artillery Battalion, Baghdad 
The Washington Post, 5 November 2003 
Figure 8 describes the General Intelligence Collection Requirements. 
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Figure 8.  General Intelligence Collection Requirements 
 
 
Source: “USBP Intelligence Unit” (internal document, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, 
Washington, DC, 2014).  
Collections is a major activity that drives the intelligence cycle, yet anecdotal 
evidence indicates collections may be undervalued at the field level. The establishment of 
clear guidelines and standard operating procedure for collections at the field level is 
paramount for thorough and consistent intelligence collections. Identification of 
collection requirements with stakeholders, doctrinal procedure, methods for data 
management, and accountability and tasking of collection assets are the core of the 
collections process. The development of USBP intelligence doctrine, and subsequent 
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field manuals would help agents understand what guiding principles to adhere to when 
conducting information collection duties.  
1. The Collection Manager 
It is readily apparent that there is not an “official” collection manager position. 
Collection management varies station to station, sector to sector based on local 
requirements (see Figure 9). The Army’s 2013 Field Manual 3–55, Information 
Collection states:  
Respective collection managers employ organic means to cover the seams 
and gaps between units. These organic means provide the deploying 
tactical force with the most complete portrayal possible of the enemy and 
potential adversaries, the populace, and the environmental situation upon 
entry.125  
Figure 9.  Collection Management Cross Section: Horizontal View 
 
Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Information Collection. 
At the field level, the collection manager is a relationship based, task facilitator. 
Additionally, the collection manager must be familiar with all the collection capabilities 
                                                 
125 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Information Collection (FM 3-55) (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/
fm3_55.pdf.  
 64 
at their disposal, and the people who have tactical control (TACON) of those capabilities. 
Understanding that collection assets are finite, the collection manager has the task of 
coordinating the most effective means of collection based on prioritization and risk. 
Collection managers’ duties include those listed in Figure 10.  
• Facilitating the development of integrated collection strategies against 
priority collection targets 
• Optimizing the employment of collection assets 
• Requesting collection resources (e.g., SIU, OI, DHA IA) 
• Pushing and/or pulling information and requirements from collection 
assets to stakeholders and command staff 
• Ensuring prioritized intelligence collections 
• Identifying intelligence collection capability shortfalls  
• Gathering information is prioritized, prepped, and transferred to intel 
agent for analysis 
• Understanding analysis driven collection feeds intelligence driven 
operations 
Figure 10.  Collection Management Cross Section: Vertical View 
 
Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Information Collection. 
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2. Collection at the Field Level 
Every agent, asset, and stakeholder in the field is a potential collection asset. The 
USBP needs to provide a field-level list of indicators (observable phenomenon) in a 
simple, easily understood manner. This list should map to the station’s respective priority 
intelligence requirements.  
An indicator list, simply defined, is a compilation of projected, anticipated 
or hypothetical actions which any nation might take in preparation for 
hostilities or other inimical actions. Such lists, often compiled without 
regard to whether it was likely or even possible to collect the desired 
information, proved of assistance to both collectors and analysts, provided 
they were not regarded as a bible of what to expect.126 
As demonstrated in the Tucson Intelligence/Operations Communications Study, there is 
an appetite for agents to know what they should “look out” for in the field, and it is the 
responsibility of the BPA-Is and collection mangers to communicate those indicators and 
provide feedback on information collected.127 
3. Processing and Exploitation 
We face a dispersed, complex, and “asymmetric” threat environment in 
which information technology makes everything move faster; in which 
strategic and tactical requirements are becoming more blurred; and in 
which diverse and shifting priorities increase the demands from consumers 
for expert analysis in real time and from collectors who, more than ever, 
need sustained guidance on priorities and greater assistance with 
exploitation. 
Dr. William J. Lahneman, The Future of Intelligence Analysis, 2006 
Processing and exploitation is critical to managing collections, as it is the 
cleansing and organizing stage of the intelligence cycle and a necessary precursor to 
“sensemaking,” or analysis and production. Integral to processing and exploitation, an 
information sharing architecture, is needed to link the 900 disparate systems in DHS, 
                                                 
126 Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, Analysis for Strategic Warning, 63. 
127 U.S. Border Patrol, Tucson Sector Operations Division, “Red Team Operational Exercise: Ajo 
Analysis.” 
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located primarily on unclassified networks with a variety of user populations.128 At least 
250 data sets have multiple data formats and standards, non-Title 50 data, U.S. persons, 
and special protected class information.  
In the 2004 GAO report, Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, 
but Much Work Remains, the GAO stated, “The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is attempting to integrate 22 federal agencies, each specializing in one or more 
interrelated aspects of homeland security.” An enterprise architecture is a key tool to 
achieve this effectively and efficiently. In September 2003, DHS issued an initial version 
of its architecture (see Figure 11).  
Figure 11.  DHS Data Framework 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Data Framework.” 
                                                 
128 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Data Framework” (internal document, DHS Joint 
Requirements Council, Washington, DC, 2015).   
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DHS has been struggling since 2003 to implement a functional, accessible, 
information sharing architecture and efforts are still ongoing.” It is a testament to the 
challenge of information sharing that 12 years after the 2004 GAO report, DHS continues 
to research and develop an information sharing architecture. In FY15 the USBP 
demonstrated a technology pilot for information sharing and advanced analytics. 
Currently, efforts are underway to develop joint requirements for the acquisition of an 
information sharing technology for CBP. 
4. Analysis and Production 
And then there is that other thinking: Thinking about the conundrums that 
we face, the alternatives and choices we have to make on larger issues, the 
dilemmas we wish to resolve. 
Mark Lowenthal 
Figure 12.  Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office and CADENA 
Overview and Introduction to Joint Task Force-West 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Data Framework.” 
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Analysis and production (sometimes referred to as visualization) is often 
overvalued as the most critical phase of the intelligence cycle, as it is the culmination and 
representation of actionable intelligence. BPA-Is need a suite of tools to produce and 
visualize intelligence to stakeholders, consumers, and decision makers (see Figure 13).  
Figure 13.  Attributes of Excellent Intelligence 
 
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence. 
Often, production becomes a reporting requirement that becomes perfunctory as a “report 
card” or artifact. BPA-Is should measure the value of analysis and production through the 
filter of the eight attributes of intelligence excellence. In addition, BPA-Is should assess 
and challenge commanders for feedback on their products and constantly strive to 
improve and enhance the value and usability of products.  
5. Dissemination 
The goal of a knowledge sharing process is to create, facilitate, and 
manage a horizontally based, vertically integrated knowledge transfer 
system designed to harness emerging enemy and friendly information to 
create a competitive advantage against a networked threat through 
technological innovation and cultural engagement. 
Commander’s Handbook for Attack the Network 
In the U.S. Border Patrol, there is no lack of dissemination. The problem is too 
much or duplicative dissemination. The transition from a need to know to a need to share 
has created a culture where email is the primary channel of communication while also 
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used as a system of record. Anecdotally, from supervisors on up, agents are inundated 
with many (tens to hundreds) of emails per day. There is no logical, practical method of 
labeling or tagging information in emails to categorize urgent information by importance 
and value. Often, it is up to the users to determine the value of the information in email to 
them. The USBP needs to understand the users’ needs and develop a plan for a complete 
dissemination overhaul leveraging modern technology to ensure the right people get the 
information they need in time to use it. Conversely, all others should have access to the 
information in a searchable, user-friendly database to access data that would otherwise 
flood their inbox on an hourly basis.  
6. Red Team 
What is Red Teaming?  
Red teaming is “diagnostic, preventative, and corrective; yet it is neither 
predictive or a solution. Our goal is to be better prepared and less 
surprised in dealing with complexity. Red Teaming is a function executed 
by trained, educated, and practiced team members that provides 
commanders an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in 
plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context 
of the operational environment and from the perspectives of our partners, 
adversaries, and others.”129  
Red Team Handbook 7.0, 2015 
In 2004, the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, recognized a need 
for advanced analytical support for planning, intelligence, and decision making.130 The 
intent of Red Teaming is to foster critical thinking, develop cultural empathy, promote 
consideration of alternative perspectives on problems, engage everyone in the network, 
and encourage introspection and self-awareness.131 Since 2009, the USBP has been 
working with the U.S. Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies to 
develop a Red Team capability organic to the U.S. Border Patrol. Approximately, 120 
agents have graduated from the Red Team program, but the return on investment is 
                                                 
129 Red Team Handbook, version 6.0. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid.  
 70 
unknown at this point. Although a thorough audit nationwide has not been done, an 
informal review yielded the following examples of U.S. Border Patrol Red Team 
projects: 
USBP 
• May 2013: U.S. Border Patrol Strategic Plan/Balanced Scorecard 
Analysis  
Tucson Sector 
• March 2013 Ajo Gotaway Red Team Study 
• April 2013: Mariposa Port of Entry Cargo Operations Study 
El Centro Sector 
• September 2015: Eastbound I-8 Checkpoint Analysis132 
Both the Army and the USBP have had challenges in leveraging the Red Team 
capability for two major reasons. The first major constraint was that the “best and 
brightest,” the ideal Red Team candidates, cannot often be spared the time for Red Team 
training or Red Team projects. This has often led to staffing Red Team trainings with 
those most available but not necessarily the best candidates, undermining the 
effectiveness of the concept. Second, there is no clear place to put the function as Red 
Teaming can support intelligence by providing alternative adversary analysis, support 
operations with alternative analysis, and support decision making with a host of Red 
Team tools to reveal unintended consequences. The Army has appeared to find a 
compromise where division and headquarters are staffed with officers who are Red Team 
trained. When the commander or chief of staff needs a Red Team effort, he or she can 
pull together a focused Red Team from across the staff that is trained in Red Team tools 
and methods.133  
Planning, intelligence, and Red Teaming are independent functions, yet they need 
to be cross-functional in execution to attain strategic, operational, and tactical goals. The 
USBP has an organic Red Team capability that can work with the Intelligence and 
Operations Division to add the value and rigor of critical and creative thinking toward the 
                                                 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid.   
 71 
complex problem of adaptive adversary operations in the homeland security ecosystem. It 
is highly recommend that the USBP gain an understanding of all Red Team efforts and 
outcomes in the field. In addition, the USBP could better utilize its cadre of trained Red 
Team personnel as an additional level of analytical rigor, validation, and verification of 
assumptions for critical topics such use of force, body-worn cameras, and human rights. 
E. VISION FOR THE FUTURE 
Intelligence is a specialized form of knowledge, an activity, and an 
organization. As knowledge, intelligence informs leaders, uniquely aiding 
their judgment and decision-making. As an activity, it is the means by 
which data and information are collected, their relevance to an issue 
established, interpreted to determine likely outcomes, and disseminated to 
individuals and organizations who can make use of it, otherwise known as 
“consumers of intelligence.” 
An intelligence organization directs and manages these activities to create 
such knowledge as effectively as possible. 
David Moore, Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis  
The DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis and CBP Office of Intelligence could 
be considered the central nervous system of the homeland security friendly force 
ecosystem. If so, then the USBP and its BPA-Is are the eyes and ears (i.e., the nerve 
endings and the sensory inputs into the friendly force information sharing network). Of 
course, there are a host of friendly force stakeholders that comprise the friendly force 
information-sharing network, but no single agency has the intelligence collections 
manpower of the USBP. The USBP can continue to develop and enhance the BPA-Is’ 
capability and capacity to execute every stage of the intelligence cycle with excellence.  
The USBP is at the precipice of a new age in information sharing. Massive efforts 
have been underway to provide an enterprise architecture to provide the connectivity and 
access to the full breadth and depth of the homeland security information and data 
management systems. The USCG and DHS IA may be actual members of the IC, but the 
U.S. Border Patrol has a significant advantage: its 21,000 agents embedded in the border 
security environment. The USBP should start indoctrinating all agents at the academy 
about their role in collections and the function of the intelligence cycle. Furthermore, the 
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U.S Border Patrol must evolve its paradigm of the agent’s role in border security to 
emphasize collection and information sharing holistically and comprehensively. The time 
is now for the U.S. Border Patrol to harness and exploit the full power and capability of 
its intelligence enterprise by understanding current capabilities and charting a path 














APPENDIX A. PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
ASSOCIATIONS—ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR BPA-IS 
Consummate Border Patrol intelligence professionals should seek to enrich their 
knowledge and personnel development by engaging others in the law enforcement 
intelligence field. There are a wealth of low-cost or no-cost opportunities available. The 
USBP Intelligence Division should conduct a market survey and develop a list of 
resources, available to BPA-Is. 
A preliminary market survey revealed the intelligence associations outlined 
below.  
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 
(IALEIA) 
IALEIA is the largest professional organization in the world representing law 
enforcement analysts. It is based in the United States, and is a non-profit 501(c)3 
corporation.134 
 
Source:  “International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 
(IALEIA),” International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts. 
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)  
According the AFCEA website,  
AFCEA is an international organization that serves its members by 
providing a forum for the ethical exchange of information. AFCEA is 
                                                 
134 “International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA),” International 
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, accessed August 2015, http://www.ialeia.org/.    
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dedicated to increasing knowledge through the exploration of issues 
relevant to its members in information technology, communications, and 
electronics for the defense, homeland security and intelligence 
communities.135 
 
Source: “Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA),” Armed 
Forces Communications and Electronics Association.  
Intelligence and National Security Alliance(INSA) 
INSA is the premier intelligence and national security organization that provides a 
unique venue for collaboration, networking, and examination of policy issues and 
solutions. Representing an unprecedented alliance among senior leaders from the public, 
private, and academic sectors, INSA members form an unparalleled community of 
experts who collaborate to develop creative, innovative, and timely solutions to the 
intelligence and national security issues facing the United States.136 
 
Source: “Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA),” Intelligence and National 
Security Alliance.  
                                                 
135 “Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA),” Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association, accessed August 5, 2015, http://www.afcea.org/. 
136 “Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA),” Intelligence and National Security Alliance, 
accessed August 20, 2015, http://www.insaonline.org/.    
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U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, State and Local 
Anti-Terrorism (SLATT) 
The State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program is funded by the 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Program is 
dedicated to providing critical training and resources to our nation’s law enforcement, 
who face the challenges presented by the terrorist/violent criminal extremist threat. To 
help confront this threat, the SLATT Program provides specialized multiagency anti-
terrorism detection, investigation, and interdiction training and related services to state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement and prosecution authorities.137  
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, “State and Local Anti-
Terrorism (SLATT).”  
 
 
                                                 
137 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, “State and Local Anti-Terrorism 
(SLATT),” accessed August 20, 2015, https://www.slatt.org/. 
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APPENDIX B. IC BREAKDOWN 
 
Source: Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, “CISS Names as a Center of 
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APPENDIX C. TUCSON SECTOR INTELLIGENCE/
INFORMATION SHARING STUDY: CRITICAL FINDINGS 
1. Do you know who all the BPA-I’s 











Percentage 2% 19% 22% 23% 34% 
Analysis 
Approximately 1/5 of the stations, the majority are BPAs, know less than half of 
the station BPA-Is. If field agents are unaware of who is a BPA-I, they will be 




FA3 Intel Units will ensure that a contact list of BPA-I with phone numbers and 
email is included in Muster Modules, briefs, etc. The Intel contact list will be 
posted in all common areas for increased visibility. 
Target Goals 
1. Do you know who all the BPA-I’s 











Percentage 0% 5% 10% 35% 50% 
Percentage Change -
100% 
-73% -54% +52% +47% 
 
2. How likely are you to contact a 
BPA-I if you had info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 
Percentage 2% 6% 16% 39% 37% 
Analysis 
76% of FA3 would “Most likely” or “Definitely” contact a BPA-I with info.  
 
Recommendations  
Develop a “go by” for all station personnel that will standardize the information 
sharing process. 
Target Goals  
2. How likely are you to contact a 
BPA-I if you had info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 




-17% -38% -10% +49% 
 
3. How likely are you to get feedback 
from a BPA-I if you gave them info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 
Percentage 11% 13% 20% 38% 17% 
Analysis 
Approximately 24% of FA3 feels that it is “Not likely” or “Maybe” they will get 
feedback from a BPA-I on information provided. If field agents are not receiving 
feedback they will be less likely to share information. 
 
Recommendations 
Implement an initiative to track and respond to any agent submitting information to Intel.  
Target Goals 
3. How likely are you to get feedback 
from a BPA-I if you gave them info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 
Percentage 5% 5% 10% 50% 30% 
Percentage Change -54% -62% -50% +32% +76% 
 
 






Note  Phone 
call  
Email 
Percentage 0% 35% 14% 17% 34% 
 
Analysis 
The majority of the station prefers face-to-face or email to communicate info. 
Face to face interaction is invaluable, yet there should be a standardized process 
to collect and memorial. 
 
Recommendations  
Establish a “go by” to standardize the intelligence sharing process from the field to Intel. 
Target Goals 






Note  Phone 
call  
Email 
Percentage 0% 35% 14% 17% 34% 
Percentage Change 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
 
5. How would you rate communication 
between Intel and the field 
None Poor Fair Good Outstanding 
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Percentage 3% 17% 32% 43% 5% 
Analysis 
Approximately 50% of the station perceives that communication is Fair or worse. 
Recommendation 
Standardize, institutionalize, and memorialize of identified best practices for 
sharing information to increase communication and situational awareness between 
field and Intel agents.  
Target Goals 
5. How would you rate communication 
between Intel and the field 
None Poor Fair Good Outstanding 
Percentage 0% 10% 20% 65% 10% 
Percentage Change -
100% 
-41% -38% +51% +100% 
       
6. What can Intel do to improve communications with the field? (Top five 
suggestions) 
 
1) Increase Intelligence Muster Presentations   
2) Educate/Inform Agents about Intel duties, functions, and capabilities 
3) Dispel the “secret squirrel” perception and clarify what information is need to 
know 
 
4) Provide feedback to agents who have submitted information to Intel  
 




This question yielded 168 relevant, appropriate, and actionable responses. 
Recommendations 
1) Increase Intelligence Muster Presentations 
 Continue to attend station musters with a goal of 100% attendance 
 Disseminate information and intelligence on current trends, patterns, and 
predictive analysis of potential futures  
 Seek out agents directly after muster to develop coalescent knowledge of 
current trends and patterns 
2) Educate/Inform Agents about Intel duties, functions, and capabilities 
3) Dispel the “secret squirrel” perception and clarify what information is “need to 
know” 
 Create Intel 101 Presentation to be disseminated via email to all agents 
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 Update presentation for presentation at musters at the beginning of each 
Fiscal year 
 Utilize face-to-face interactions as “teachable moments” to explain the 
intelligence process 
4) Provide feedback to agents who have submitted information to Intel 
 Provide timely feedback to agents on any information that is provided to 
Intel  
 Exploit opportunities to provide feedback and follow-up on significant 
events, issues, and occurrences to providing informal training to the field  
 Continue to provide specific indicators to agents at muster and solicit 
feedback from agents on refining indicators based on observations 
5) Make sure all shifts are getting the same Intel briefs at muster on any given day 
 Standardize communication between Intel agents on each shift to provide 
visibility of what was briefed and ensure the same information is briefed at 
each muster  
A six-question survey was created to gauge agent, supervisor, and command staff 
perception about elements of communication between intelligence and field units. 
Surveys were administered one-on-one to the target demographic. The survey 
administrator read the question and responses to the agent surveyed to ensure 
comprehension. For question 6, survey administrator encouraged the agent surveyed to 




Name (optional): Time in Service: 
1. Do you know who all the 











2. How likely are you to contact 
a BPA-I if you had info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 
3. How likely are you to get 
feedback from a BPA-I if you 
gave them info? 
Not 
likely 
Maybe Probably Most 
likely 
Definitely 
4. How would you provide a 





Note  Phone 
call  
Email 
5. How would you rate 
communication between Intel 
and the field 
None Poor Fair Good Outstanding 
6. What can intel do to improve Anecdotal answer; write down agent response 
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Survey responses were compiled, tabulated, and normalized for comparison and 
analysis. Agent responses to survey question 6 were analyzed and reorganized into 
general categories and ranked in descending order based on frequency of occurrence. 
Results were analyzed to reveal agents perceptions in communication gaps and 
defieciences between intel and the field. Reccomendations were generated to enhance 
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